the new russian nationalismwhen controlling for sub- sample size (Table 6.1). Finally, eco-
nomic valuations remained positive across the sub- samples, indi-
cating that ethnic minorities had no special economic grievances
that may undermine their support for Putin. Some 77 per cent of
ethnic Russians and non- Russians alike felt the economy was just
as strong or stronger than one year previously. Ethnic minority
respondents, in fact, had a somewhat more optimistic economic
outlook in absolute terms, with more of them – 26.4, compared
to 21.9 per cent among ethnic Russians – saying the economy was
improving (Table 6.1).
Responding to Putin: A caveat from the split- sample
experiment
Ethnic non- Russians were systematically more responsive to
Putin’s political messages than ethnic Russians – but not necessar-
ily the way Putin would approve. In the split- sample experiment
embedded in the surveys in Moscow, Krasnodar and Vladivostok,
the number of ethnic Russians who said ethnic diversity strength-
ens, partly strengthens and partly weakens, or weakens Russia
was practically the same, regardless of whether the question was
asked with or without a prompt saying Putin believed diversity
strengthened Russia: the Putin cue simply had no effect. This was
not the case among ethnic non- Russians, where the Putin cue had
a sizeable and statistically significant effect – a mere 0.1 per cent
probability that the difference between the Putin- cue and no-
Putin- cue results was due to chance alone.^17
However, the Putin cue resonated negatively among ethnic non-
Russians. After hearing that Putin said that diversity strength-
ened Russia, fewer non- Russians agreed with that statement than
without the prompt. The Putin cue reduced the percentage of non-
Russians who believed diversity strengthened Russia by almost a
fifth – from 32 to 26 per cent in absolute terms. The ethnic non-
Russians in this test responded as if they mistrusted Putin: it was
as if Putin said one thing, he meant the opposite, or if he proposed
a course of action, the best bet would be not to follow it.^18
Substantively, such a response poses a challenge to the Kremlin
- although hardly a pressing or sizeable one. In the final count,