changes in russian nationalist public opinion 2013–14from just 15 per cent in May 2013 to 32 per cent in November
2014.
Do these notable jumps in pro- Putin feelings reflect equally
large leaps in nationalist sentiment in Russia, as would happen
if the ‘rally- around- the- leader’ effect were more fundamentally
a ‘rally- around- the- flag’ effect? This question is discussed in the
following sections. We begin by examining issues of ethnic pride,
and then turn to whether Russians see their state in mono- ethnic
or multi- ethnic terms. Next we examine issues of interpersonal
tolerance and prejudice, followed by consideration of differ-
ences that Russians perceive between themselves and other ethnic
groups. Interestingly enough, here we find far greater continuity
than change: the increase in nationalist sentiment is nowhere near
the scale of the surge in pro- Putin feelings.
Ethnic pride and privilege: Enduring valuations
Despite widespread reporting of a rising tide of ethnic Russian
nationalism in the immediate aftermath of the annexation of
Crimea (see, for example, Marten 2014; Levada Centre 2014b),
the NEORUSS surveys find no significant rise in ethnic pride from
May 2013 to November 2014. Indeed, pride in one’s ethnicity – or,
in the language of post- Soviet states, ‘nationality’ – has remained
highly stable throughout the period covered by the surveys we
consider here and going back to at least 2005. In 2005, 2013 and
2014, more than half of the respondents – 55, 53 and 56 per cent,
respectively – said they were ‘very proud’ of their ethnic identity,
and some 35–40 per cent in each survey said they were ‘mostly
proud’.^6 These changes are well within the combined sampling
error of the surveys. Considering that approximately 90 per cent
of respondents in the 2013 and 2014 surveys identified themselves
as ethnic Russians, one may have expected the share of those who
said they were very proud of their nationality to increase markedly
in 2014. After all, the overwhelming majority of Russians enthu-
siastically supported the annexation of Crimea, and protection
of ethnic Russians there from the putative threat of a ‘Ukrainian
fascist junta’ in the wake of the successful Euromaidan revolu-
tion was a strong message that the Kremlin disseminated through