the new russian nationalismRussia regardless of nationality remained relatively steady at 29
per cent. But the share of those who saw it as referring solely to
ethnic Russians fell to just 30 per cent, while the proportion of
those who understood it as referring primarily but not exclusively
to ethnic Russians leapt to 41 per cent. By late 2014, then, well
over two- thirds of those surveyed indicated that the term russkii
was not necessarily ethnically exclusive. This is particularly note-
worthy since many observers have cited Putin’s striking use of
the term russkie in his dramatic March 2014 speech justifying
the Crimea annexation, in claiming that the Kremlin had shifted
to seeking a more ethnically exclusive basis of its legitimacy (see,
for example, Marten 2014).
The specific finding in the previous paragraph, then, under-
scores that not all Russians are likely to interpret Putin’s claims
to Crimea as reflecting a purely ethnic conception of the Russian
state. In fact, Putin appears to be playing on the same conceptual
ambiguity that the Kremlin has long used in its nationality policy
(Shevel 2011). The larger finding of this section, accordingly, is
that the Russian state came to inspire greater pride at the same
time as it became more multi- ethnic in Russian eyes, even in light
of Putin’s Crimea speech.
Publicly acceptant, privately selective
Opinion trends discussed so far indicate that, even though eth-
nocentric and xenophobic views remained strong, respondents
generally became more publicly acceptant of ethnic diversity in
Russia as a state and a nation from May 2013 to November 2014.
At the same time, we also find that when it comes to the inclusion
or exclusion of specific ethnic groups in respondents’ private lives,
acceptance levels waxed and waned selectively. In particular, it
emerges that the Kremlin’s demonisation of Ukraine’s Euromaidan
protests and its leadership – a discourse that frequently por-
trays anti- Russian ‘fascism’ as a major strain in Ukrainian public
opinion – has had a palpable effect on the private lives of Russians
concerning relationships with Ukrainians, despite Kremlin rheto-
ric that has attempted to portray a good Ukrainian population as
victimised by a violent, even genocidal junta.