the new russian nationalismJews: the number of respondents who viewed Belarusians as desir-
able went up from 33 to 40 per cent and those who viewed Jews as
desirable rose from about 14 to 20 per cent. Why would positive
attitudes toward Belarusians and Jews increase? The survey data
as such do not offer definitive answers, but we can venture at least
a speculative interpretation here. There is little reason to suspect
that these shifts have resulted from any kind of change in how
Russians understood the cultures or behaviour patterns of these
groups, as no major events come to mind that may have changed
longstanding public perceptions of any intrinsic properties of these
groups in such a short period. A change in the geopolitical prism
through which these groups are viewed, however, may account for
this shift. One issue that could be examined further in this regard
is the effect of the Kremlin’s extensive use during 2014 of anti-
Nazi, Great Patriotic War (Second World War) tropes to mobilise
patriotic passions among Russians in support of its Ukraine policy.
This mobilisation included the invocation of powerful emotive
symbols such as the orange- and- black striped ribbons of the Order
of St George – a decoration for exceptional valour in war, highly
esteemed by ordinary Russians. A potent symbol of victory in
the Soviet Union’s Great Patriotic War of 1941–5, these ribbons
became one of the principal identifiers of the Russian military
operating without insignia and of their mercenaries and allies
in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, starting with their takeover of
Ukrainian government buildings in February and March 2014.
The Great Patriotic War trope may thus have increased the per-
ceived affinity with Belarusians – notably since Nazi collabora-
tion rhetoric with respect to Belarusians was absent or marginal
in Soviet and post- Soviet Russia. And given the deeply embed-
ded understanding of Jews as among the principal victims of the
Nazis, the sense of affinity with them could have increased out of
common perception of victimisation inspired by Russian media.
With many more respondents than before now seeing sharp
negative lines dividing them from Ukrainians, what specifically
was it that they understood as the chief sources of division?
The 2014 NEORUSS survey added some new questions, asking
Russians what they thought most unites the peoples of Russia
and Ukraine and also what they thought most divides them.