the new russian nationalismmobile population that had previously been largely passive when
it came to politics, many of whom had previously concentrated
mainly on business or other professional activity but envisioned
a more ‘modern’ Russia with a more open political system free of
corruption. The protesters were not unified in their political per-
suasions beyond their detestation of the fraud and machinations
of the regime, however. They included not only Western- oriented
liberals, but a wide range of patriots and nationalists, some of
whom (like Navalnyi) sought to forge a brand of liberal national-
ism. With the protesters turning out in such numbers and coming
from Russia’s rising classes, some predicted that the regime was
doomed, bound to fall from power in the next year or two.
The authorities’ initial response was to loosen political con-
trols and convince people that they would not resort to such
fraud in the 2012 presidential election scheduled for three months
later, in March. Many opposition figures who had long since
disappeared from state- controlled television except in a negative
light now reappeared as commentators or the subject of ordinary
reporting, laws restricting party registration were liberalised, a
form of direct gubernatorial elections was restored and online-
viewable web cameras were installed in nearly all precincts for
the presidential contest. The Kremlin’s chief political mastermind,
Vladislav Surkov, was ushered out of the presidential administra-
tion, a move that was also compatible with bringing in a new
figure who could shift strategy later on. All this did take some
of the steam out of the protest movement, leading many to hope
for a political thaw in response to the newfound assertiveness of
Russia’s growing ‘creative class’.
Also part of the Kremlin’s response, however, was actively to
seek out new bases of popular support. One such move focused
on the immediate task of getting Putin elected back to the presi-
dency in March 2012 and put the emphasis back on his personal-
ity and leadership style (his most fundamental basis of support)
and, now, adding to it the status of ‘father of the nation’, some-
thing that could also turn his older age into a positive. While this
was the strategy featured in Putin’s formal campaign activity,
Kremlin officials and allies were taking the first tentative steps
toward a major shift in how it sought to connect with the public.