the new russian nationalismConclusion
This chapter has argued that despite the strong role of cor-
ruption and machine politics in Russia’s patronal presidential
system, public support has been consistently important not only
in helping keep Putin and his team in power in Russia, but also
in facilitating his ability to close the political space and foreclose
opposition. While this support has certainly been facilitated by
strong control over the most influential mass media (especially
television), the experience of the USSR shows that even complete
media control does not guarantee a regime the approval of the
ruled. Indeed, Putin’s public support had its roots well before the
regime obtained such media control, and its sources have been
Putin’s own personal appeal, his connection with the public on
important broad policy directions (such as continuing to favour
a market- based economy over socialism) and – very importantly
- his association with the rapid economic growth experienced
by the country over the course of the 2000s and, to a lesser
extent, the 2010s. Putin’s team heavily emphasised these factors –
particularly in contrast with the fecklessness of his predecessors in
the economically difficult 1990s – in its vigorous efforts to sustain
and augment its public support.
At the same time, this chapter has argued that nationalism had
not been a major part of the Kremlin’s strategy for sustaining or
gaining public support until 2014. Prior to that time, politicising
nationalism was considered too risky. This was less because of
any widespread public opposition to nationalism – indeed, the
Kremlin’s main political opponents all championed it. Instead,
part of the challenge nationalism posed for Putin was that his
own support had consistently tended to come from relative mod-
erates on Russia’s spectrum of nationalism. Indeed, his main
opponents had much earlier staked out stronger stands at the
extremes, so there was also a risk that politicising the issue could
benefit them more than him. But even if the Kremlin could hope
to completely ‘capture’ whatever stand on the issue it wanted,
there was another problem: There is not just one ‘Russian nation-
alism’, but instead there are multiple Russian nationalisms. And
these nationalisms tend to contradict one another, meaning that