the new russian nationalisman economy on its way to modernisation, strengthened by soft-
power tools. Surkov has been highly critical of those who look
back to the Soviet experience and those who feel attracted by a
Eurasian or Asian destiny for Russia. Instead, he stresses the need
for Russian national identity to look forward and to identify as a
‘second Europe’ (Surkov 2010; see also Sakwa 2011b).
The question of ideology again took centre- stage during the
presidential elections of March 2008 and the transfer of power
from Putin and Medvedev. During the December 2007 legisla-
tive elections, Putin made a point of criticising United Russia for
its lack of ideology: ‘Has United Russia proven to be an ideal
political structure? Quite obviously not. It has no formed ideol-
ogy, no principles for which the majority of its members would
be ready to do battle and to stake its authority’ (Putin 2007b).
The establishment of a Putin/Medvedev diarchy (dvoevlastie) in
2008 expanded the space for greater ideological content inside the
presidential party itself.
Party wings had begun to take shape from 2005 on, but they
first became institutionalised under Medvedev. The liberal wing,
led by Vladimir Pligin and Valerii Fadeev, includes several figures
who began their political careers in the Union of Right Forces
before rallying behind United Russia. This wing has been close
to the magazine Ekspert. Its club, the Club of 4 November,
wanted the Kremlin to prioritise the monetisation of social ben-
efits, promote private property and private entrepreneurship and
reduce the role of the security services in Russia’s political and
economic life. By contrast, the conservative wing and its think
tank, the Centre for Social Conservative Policy, calls for Russia to
develop a policy giving priority to the state in the economy, and
underscores Russia’s Soviet great- power legacy and the need for
national pride in ‘Russianness’ (Laruelle 2009b).
Outside of the presidential party, Medvedev authorised more
provocative ideological trends, like that represented by the
Institute for Modern Development (INSOR), which advocates
Russia’s return to a Western path. Led by Igor Iurgens, a promi-
nent lobbyist in the investment and insurance sector, INSOR
quickly became Medvedev’s spearhead for the narrative of ‘mod-
ernisation’ (Smith 2010). The institute has published several