the new russian nationalismin diversity.^49 This recognition and simultaneous denial of the
‘Crimean Tatar problem’ exposes the tension between Putin’s
neo- imperialist/Eurasianist variant on Russian patriotism (that
like its nineteenth- and twentieth- century predecessors, aspires
to square the need for inclusivity and inter- ethnic harmony with
the imperative to maintain the dominant ethnic group’s power),
and the isolationist nationalism of media figures like Kiselev, for
whom ‘Muslim minorities’ constitute a problem.
But neo- imperialist pretensions towards Ukrainian territory
(Eastern Ukraine was frequently characterised by official sources
from Putin downwards as Novorossiia), Eurasianist indignation
at Kyiv’s tilt towards the EU and isolationist privileging of ethnic
Russian interests, converge in Russian support for the separatist
fighters. In short, rather than the actions of a geopolitical empire
builder aspiring to re- establish the former Soviet bloc, Russia’s
illegitimate venture in Ukraine represents a deeply insecure regime
projecting an inner struggle to articulate a coherent national iden-
tity on to its external environment.
Likewise, the anti- Western bile that saturated the Russian media
as the Ukraine crisis reached its peak cannot be seen outside the
context of the more generalised ‘othering’ process we observed in
relation to the coverage of migration issues. An illustration of the
line of continuity came with Vesti’s tarring of the Crimean Tatar
leader, Mustafa Dzhemilev, with the brush of Islamist extremism,
and its portrayal of his efforts to mobilise opposition to Russia’s
annexation of Crimea as the consequence of his prominence
within a Euromaidan movement coordinated by hostile Western
forces and determined to provoke sedition among the Tatars.^50
In this paranoid cocktail, Islam, Tatar ethnicity, Western con-
spirators and Ukrainian dupes take turns in occupying the slot
of a hostile Other whose precise identity mutates according to
circumstance.
When contextualising the descent of federal television discourse
into crude state propaganda designed to solidify public support
for Putin’s controversial Ukraine policy, we must recognise that,
as our analysis showed, prominent media personae like Kiselev,
rather than passively implementing Kremlin edicts, are also active
players in shaping the Kremlin’s media strategy. But the very