the place of economics in russian national identitythinking is shared by many mainstream Russian economists such
as Viktor Polterovich and Vladimir Popov, who argue that pro-
tectionism has been successful for many countries in the past,
enabling them to develop high- value- added industries and not see
their economies shrink to low- value sectors in which they have
a global comparative advantage, such as resource extraction or
agriculture (Polterovich and Popov 2005). In fact, critics of neo-
liberalism dominate the pages of the leading academic economics
journal in Russia, Voprosy ekonomiki, the publication of the
Institute of Economics of the Academy of Sciences.
Russia’s anaemic party structure consists of a dominant ruling
party and a handful of officially tolerated ‘opposition’ parties.
As Leonid Poliakov noted, ‘There are no nationalist parties, if
one does not take the LDPR as a nationalist party’ (quoted in K.
Loginov 2013). This is not because of a lack of support among
voters, but because of divisions within the nationalist camp – and
because of the Kremlin’s determination to prevent such a party
emerging.
The Kremlin’s own nationalism built on state patriotism and
anti- Western rhetoric. This was clear in Surkov’s concept of ‘sov-
ereign democracy’, reaffirmed in his 2006 article ‘Nationalising
the future’, in which he looked for a community of sovereign
democracies standing up against the ‘global dictator’ and cri-
tiqued liberal ‘intellectuals for whom the sun rises in the West’
(Surkov 2006). Surkov argued that Russia faced the challenge
‘to preserve sovereignty without harming democracy, and to be
open without losing one’s identity’. However, ‘the main guaran-
tor of sovereignty is not only military but also all- round com-
petitiveness’. He called therefore for a ‘nationally oriented open
economy’ (Surkov 2006). He had no time for ethnic Russian
nationalists – he mockingly asked if they would want ‘a Russian
Republic within the borders of early Muscovy, an ethnic preserve
with a “do not disturb” sign on the fence’. Surkov’s approach
was purely instrumental, seeking to use nationalism to bolster
Putin’s political authority. Andrei Okara characterised his
approach as based on ‘clever marketing, studying the demands
of the target audience and a calculated pursuit of the fashion for
“ genuineness’” (Okara 2007). The Kremlin was able to wrest