the new russian nationalismphilosopher Ivan Ilin, the direct successor of the intellectual tradi-
tion of the later Slavophiles. These ideas are most fully reflected
in Putin’s programmatic speech ‘Russia: the national question’
(Putin 2012b).
Not only are all the elements of the imperial syndrome interde-
pendent, they also provide mutual stability, acting as precondi-
tions for the reproduction of the entire construction. Here let me
mention only a few aspects of this interdependency:
First, as long as the ‘imperial body’ remains, fears about its
destruction will persist. Such fears became widespread after the
collapse of the USSR, which, judging by the research of sociolo-
gists at VTsIOM, the majority of Russians still consider the most
important and painful event of recent years (VTsIOM 2002: 19).
The presence of national republics within Russia is a reminder
that the USSR’s fate could be repeated in Russia.
Second, as long as there are fears that the imperial body can be
destroyed or captured by internal or external enemies, hopes of
a ‘firm hand’ and ‘wise tsar’ also multiply. These stereotypes, in
turn, are used as grounds for the restoration and strengthening
of centralisation – in other words, the imperial order. Putin, in
particular, based the introduction of federal districts in May 2000
(Zamiatin and Zamiatina 2000), and later the necessity of replac-
ing elected governors with appointed ones, on the need to combat
separatism.
Third, the size of the imperial body engenders ‘great- power’
ambitions. According to the Eurasianists, whose ideas have now
become increasingly popular in Russia, a country possessing the
largest territory on earth cannot but have a special geopolitical
role in the world, cannot but claim the status of a Great Country:
‘Geography as destiny’, as their famous formula puts it (Dugin
1997).
The various links in the chain imperial body/imperial
consciousness/imperial power can activate one another in many
ways. Here I outline only the aspects connected with the resto-
ration of ‘imperial consciousness’, which, in my opinion, is not
inherent in the public consciousness of the entire population, or
even in the Russian mentality. Imperial consciousness comes to
life only when interested political forces – acting, moreover, under