142 Strawsonian Compatibilism
necessary for moral responsibility. If Frankfurt’s argument is sound, then the
strongest sort of freedom necessary for moral responsibility should be explained
in terms of source freedom—a kind of freedom that does not require the ability
to do otherwise (leeway freedom).
We note two things about each of these two contributions. First, each is
highly focused in the sense that it can be understood in terms of a controversy
regarding some specific proposition that has an immediate bearing on assessing
the (or a) free will problem. These propositions are, respectively: the ability to
do otherwise is incompatible with determinism (assessed in Chapter 4), and the
ability to do otherwise is required for moral responsibility (assessed in Chapter
5 ). Each of these disputes, being so sharply focused, permit application of well-
known tools of analytic philosophy, and each has clearly identifiable implica-
tions, making perspicuous what exactly is at stake. Second, these two
contributions also are interestingly related. In particular, the soundness of Frank-
furt’s argument would directly challenge the relevance of the Consequence
Argument—at least as it bears on moral responsibility. Moreover, the soundness
of the Consequence Argument would make the success of compatibilism turn on
the soundness of Frankfurt’s argument (or, more generally, on the justifiability
of the source conception of moral responsibility). In short, in terms of dialectical
relevance, these two theses are interestingly and intimately inter- animated, as is
perhaps easily shown by reflecting upon the Basic Leeway Argument for Incom-
patibilism (as set out in Section 3.3):
- If a person acts of her own free will, then she could have done otherwise.
- If determinism is true, no one can do otherwise than one actually does.
- Therefore, if determinism is true, no one acts of her own free will.
The Consequence Argument offers support for premise 2, while Frankfurt’s
argument can be used to attack premise 1 (so long as free will is understood in
terms of the strongest sense of control required for moral responsibility).
Given the preceding observations, Strawson’s contribution, while equally
influential (arguably more so), stands in stark contrast with the other two contri-
butions we have considered thus far. How so? The force of Strawson’s essay
“Freedom and Resentment” cannot be understood in terms of a specific line of
argumentation for or against any single proposition regarding free will or moral
responsibility. Moreover, it is not altogether clear or easy to state how it is that
Strawson’s overall position bears on any other single point regarding the
freedom of the will—such as the thesis that the ability to do otherwise is incom-
patible with determinism, or the thesis that free will and moral responsibility
require the ability to do otherwise. Instead, in this one elegant essay, Strawson
made a case for compatibilism by drawing upon a rather broad vision of the
overall debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists. And he did so by
developing (what was then) a novel way of theorizing about the very nature of
moral responsibility. While “Freedom and Resentment” does contain at least
three distinct and clearly identifiable specific arguments for compatibilism, and