Three Source Incompatibilist Arguments 151BD, that is, are due to the way she is mentally. But if she is not morally respons-
ible for at least some crucial aspect of the way she is mentally at the time at
which she acts, then she is not morally responsible for her action, since her
action is due to the way she is mentally. What would be required for her to be
morally responsible for BD? Well, she would have to be responsible for her
freely acquiring BD. So the way she was mentally in the acquisition of BD
would have to be the product of something she did freely and for which she is
morally responsible. But then there must have been some other belief–desire
pair, BD′ that non- deviantly led to her acquisition of BD, and for her to be
morally responsible for BD, she must be morally responsible for BD′. And so
on, ad infinitum.
It turns out that, on this version of the Ultimacy Argument, a person is
morally responsible for her actions only if she freely chose and brought about
her own self. But this is impossible; therefore, so is morally responsible agency.
Consider Galen Strawson’s version of this argument (1994: 5):
- Nothing can be causa sui—nothing can be the cause of itself.
- In order to be truly morally responsible for one’s actions one would have to
be causa sui, at least in certain crucial mental respects. - Therefore, nothing can be truly morally responsible.
As explained above, to remain focused on the topic of freedom, we will cast
these arguments explicitly in terms of freedom. So, consider then this slight
amendment to Strawson’s argument:
1. Nothing can be causa sui—nothing can be the cause of itself.
2. In order to be free in the strongest sense required to be truly morally
responsible for one’s actions one would have to be causa sui, at least in
certain crucial mental respects.
3*. Therefore, nothing can be free in the strongest sense required to be truly
morally responsible.
This version of the Ultimacy Argument is very ambitious. Note that determinism
does not play any role in the argument at all. Hence, it is not an argument for
incompatibilism in the traditional sense, since it does not say that determinism is
what rules out freedom and moral responsibility. Rather, the very concept of
moral responsibility, at least in the “true” basic-desert-involving sense, is inco-
herent. It has the seeds in it of a demand that is metaphysically impossible to
achieve (for finite beings). So, let us label this version of the Ultimacy Argument
an impossibilist version.^8 We can take this argument for impossibilism about
freedom and responsibility to feature the thesis that free and morally responsible
agency is impossible due to the very concept of responsibility (or freedom), and
not because of any fact about the universe (such as that it is deterministic).
How convincing is this version of the Ultimacy Argument? In our view, the
second premise is problematic. It masks an especially important assumption that