Three Source Incompatibilist Arguments 17720 These interventions need be no different in force or severity than the sort influencing
our behavior due to changes in hormone levels or fluctuations in blood sugar.
21 This and the next four paragraphs are drawn from McKenna (2014).
22 For further development of McKenna’s argument, see also Daniel Haas (2012). See
also Pereboom’s (2014: 99–101) reply to Haas.
Also, Fischer (2011) has responded to another manipulation argument, Mele’s
(2006b) zygote argument, in a similar fashion.
23 See Daniel Haas (2012) for a defense of McKenna on this point, and Pereboom (2014)
for a reply to Haas.
24 Yet a further question, not discussed here, is whether the force of a manipulation
argument is sufficient for an incompatibilist conclusion even under the less demand-
ing assumption that manipulation at least mitigates moral responsibility. Patrick Todd
(2011) has argued that mere mitigation rather than a full judgment of nonresponsibil-
ity is enough to threaten compatibilism. However, both Justin Capes (2013) and
Hannah Tierney (2013) have argued that compatibilism is consistent with thinking
that determinism can mitigate, since it might be that forms of freedom and responsib-
ility incompatible with manipulation could be greater or more enhanced than forms
that are instead compatible with it. Andrew Khoury (2014) explores a different way
of replying to Todd, which instead focuses upon the fact that implicit in mitigation is
a concession that the manipulated agent is responsible (to some degree). For some
reservations about Khoury’s strategy, see Tierney (2014).