184 Seven Views of Contemporary Compatibilism
consideration purely from the physical stance. Hence, the physical stance will
never supplant the personal stance. We persons involved in the everyday com-
merce of interacting with each other need the personal stance; it is not threatened
by the specter of determinism. Call his view Multiple Viewpoints Compatibilism.
Dennett is also clear that holding agents responsible is to be justified on con-
sequentialist grounds (1984). Furthermore, there are no metaphysical facts about
moral responsibility independent of this consequentialist justification of holding
responsible. In Dennett’s view, there is no such thing as basic desert, and thus no
free will of the sort that is required for basic desert responsibility. In this respect,
his view is similar to some of the skeptical views we will discuss in Chapter 11.
What is free will on Dennett’s account? First, he contends that leeway
freedom is compatible with determinism, and he endorses Slote’s rejection (see
Section 4.3.3) of the Consequence Argument (Dennett, 1984: 123). While
Dennett does not offer an analysis of the ability to do otherwise, he does provide
a general explanation of leeway freedom for free agents at determined worlds in
terms of the evolution of intentionally complex beings “designed” to be able to
avoid some outcomes and seek others (2003: chapter 3).
Despite arguing that leeway freedom is compatible with determinism, like
Frankfurt (1969) Dennett contends that leeway freedom is not necessary for
moral responsibility. But he finds Frankfurt’s manner of arguing unpersuasive
for the reason that it crucially depends on esoteric examples (1984: 132). His
strategy is instead to show that our practical interests in freedom and responsib-
ility are not informed by considerations of the ability to do otherwise in the
precise sense that incompatibilists have thought of it (holding fixed the past and
the laws). One example he uses to defend his position is the case of Luther, who
when standing at the church doors, claimed that he “could do no other” (1984:
133). This argument, however, is open to an objection. The incompatibilist can
take Luther’s case to be one in which, if he were free, he literally could have
done otherwise, but given his moral convictions, he would not have done other-
wise; he was resolute.
Suppose Dennett is correct that the crucial sense of freedom for moral
responsibility does not require leeway freedom, regardless of his manner of
arguing for the point. How does he set out an account of source freedom? For
Dennett, free will consists in the ability of a person to control her conduct on the
basis of rational considerations through means that arise from, or are subject to,
critical self- evaluation, self- adjusting, and self- monitoring. That is, free will
involves responsiveness to reasons. Dennett notably provides a series of valu-
able observations about how this sort of control might have naturally arisen from
less sophisticated sorts of creatures through a process of evolution (2003). (We
will defer discussion of reasons- responsiveness here. It will be taken up in detail
in the next chapter.)
What of the source incompatibilists’ arguments, especially the manipulation
argument (discussed in Chapter 7)? As regards the condition of ultimacy—
as something the manipulation argument aims to prove—Dennett means to
put the incompatibilist on the defensive (2003: chapter 4). Ultimacy requires