1 Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Determinism
In this first chapter, we will examine the key notions in the free will debate. We
will begin by providing characterizations of free will, moral responsibility, and
determinism. We will as well consider a range of related matters, such as what
the will is, and we will introduce the notions of indeterminism, mechanism, and
naturalism.
1.1. Free Will
As it turns out, settling upon how to use the term “free will” is a controversial
matter. We propose to define the term as follows:
Free will is the unique ability of persons to exercise the strongest sense of
control over their actions necessary for moral responsibility.A free act, as we use the expression, is an act that issues from an exercise of that
ability. This definition, or something like it, while not universally accepted, is
widely shared (e.g., Haji, 2009: 18; McKenna, 2008d: 187; Mele, 2006b: 17;
Pereboom, 2001: xxii; Timpe, 2008: 11). True, it is just a starting point for theo-
rizing. It leaves unsettled what the relevant sense of control is, and it leaves
unspecified the nature of the moral responsibility at issue. These are topics we
will address in this book. But let’s begin with a few clarifications.
First, why is it common to characterize free will as a kind of control, specifi-
cally in relation to moral responsibility? Plausibly, one of at least two substan-
tive necessary conditions of an agent’s being morally responsible for something
is that it was under her control. If, for instance, you accidentally hit the gear shift
and wrecked the car because you had an unexpected seizure, you are not morally
responsible and blameworthy for hitting the gear shift or for the damage. The
reason is that you were not in control of your body. Moral responsibility very
plausibly requires control over whatever it is that an agent is responsible for.
Second, as Alfred Mele explains (2006b: 27, n18), it is crucial that the control
at issue is the strongest that is necessary for moral responsibility. There are
weaker senses of control that are necessary for moral responsibility. For instance,
it might well be a necessary condition of moral responsibility for what an agent