200 Seven Views of Contemporary Compatibilism
interpersonal relations (Section 6.5.1). This in turn would settle the proper exten-
sion of the moral community—and so of the class of morally responsible agents.
When a person is blameworthy because she acts from a morally objectionable
quality of will, what are the capacities implicated in her conduct that help ground
our sense that she is accountable for acting from such a will?
Strawson was far too confident in thinking only in terms of quality of will.
Russell’s (2004) proposal, as a plausible extension of Strawson’s compatibilism,
is that the pertinent capacity is a capacity to appreciate and be responsive to the
moral sentiments of others, and of one’s own—say, in terms of emotions like
guilt and pride. Just as fear (that is not irrational) reveals a salient understanding
of genuine danger, so too exercises of moral sense reveal a salient understanding
of the moral affections, demands, and expectations of others. One who lacked
this sense altogether, such as a psychopath or instead a very young child, would
be incapacitated for exercises of agency that could be expected of adult members
of a moral community. Although Russell does not propose any argument that
this crucial capacity is compatible with determinism, he operates under the not-
implausible presupposition that it is.
The preceding problem for Strawsonian compatibilism—identifying the capa-
cities required for participation in the moral community—was rendered all the
more pressing given that Strawson’s naturalistic claims animating his psycho-
logical impossibility argument seemed inadequate (Section 6.5.2). How so? The
mere fact that we are naturally disposed to attitudes of a certain type does not
itself show that we can set aside questions regarding the appropriateness of token
instances of them as actually manifested in thought and action. It is for this
reason that Russell’s defense of Strawsonian compatibilism is only a qualified
defense. Russell is plausibly the philosopher alive today who has given full voice
to Strawsonian compatibilism as a view that remains a live option.^8 Neverthe-
less, he has made very clear that his defense is a limited and critical one (1992,
2013). He rightly rejects Strawson’s more sweeping naturalistic attempts to
refute free will skepticism by relying on the inevitability of our human propen-
sity to the reactive attitudes like resentment and indignation. True, we are so
susceptible, but that only allows for a type- naturalism that can refute a type-
skepticism whereby it is claimed that we are not justified in even being disposed
to the having of these types of attitudes. This does nothing to refute a token-
skepticism according to which, in the instances where we manifest tokens of
these types, there is reason to believe that doing so is not ever justified. Accord-
ing to the token- skeptic, implicit in the actual expression of these attitudes is the
presumption that the agents at whom they are directed are free, and there are
reasons to believe that no one is free in the required way.
The proper way to answer these skeptics, Russell argues (1992), is by way of
Strawson’s “rationalistic” arguments that attempt to show that we have no good
reason to excuse or exempt all human agents (see Chapter 6, Sections 4.1 and
5.1). But it is exactly here that one needs to know what relevant capacities our
excuses and exemptions are really tracking (or, as the skeptics would put it,
attempting to track). Russell’s Strawson inspired proposal is cast in terms of a