206 Seven Views of Contemporary Compatibilism
Notes
1 The distinction between historical and nonhistorical theories can be understood by
considering the difference between things that are essentially historical and things that
are not (see Fischer and Ravizza, 1998: 171–3). A simple example is a sunburn. A
sunburn is a burn caused by the sun. Without that history, a burn is not a sunburn but
an injury of some other kind. Another simple example is a genuine rather than a coun-
terfeit dollar bill. Examples of nonhistorical properties are things like being a sphere
or having a broken leg. If something is spherical, it does not matter how it came to be
that way; it has the shape it has. Likewise for a broken leg.
2 It is a point of contention whether there are multiple senses of moral responsibility or
instead just one. Angela Smith (2012) has argued for a monistic thesis as against the
pluralists.
3 This calls for a brief explanation of a rather complicated metaphysical point about the
nature of causation, or more precisely, the nature of the items that can stand in causal
relations. (We cannot do justice to the issue here.) A widespread assumption is that
causation is a relation between events (where events are thought of as changes occur-
ring in time that involve substances or objects—like an acid’s being poured onto the
surface of a car, which causes the car’s paint to dissolve). It is regarded as a relative
outlier thesis that things themselves—as substances—can be causes. Of course, a
familiar libertarian approach claims that persons are unique among items in the
natural world in that they are undetermined substances with causal powers. (We
covered this libertarian view briefly in Section 3.4, and readers will also find a more
detailed treatment of it in Chapter 10.) But Nelkin argues both that substance causa-
tion is pervasive in nature and not just limited to persons as agents, and that causation
of this sort is compatible with determinism.
4 In this section, we rely on McKenna (2009a).
5 Readers will recall that we covered Pereboom’s argument in Section 7.4. We invite
readers to revisit our presentation of the argument there if they need a reminder about
the details of the argument.
6 Scanlon can say (2008: 180–1), when conventional compatibilist constraints on
freedom are violated, like duress or coercion, there is reason to think the person does
not have an objectionable attitude.
7 As readers might recall from discussion of Strawson (Section 6.4.1), excuses involve
specific pleas that one is not responsible for some bit of conduct, such as “I did not
see you there.” Exemptions involve pleas that a person is not competent to function as
a morally responsible agent, such as, “She did not understand what she was doing.
She is severely mentally ill.”
8 Recall, we noted in Chapter 6 that while Strawson has dramatically influenced con-
temporary debates about freedom and responsibility, few contemporary philosophers
defend his basic compatibilist proposal. In a qualified way, Russell does.
9 Indeed, Russell (1995) argues against orthodoxy that Hume’s views are far more
aligned with Strawsonian compatibilism than with the traditional classical compatibi-
lism of the Schlick/Ayer variety.
10 To be clear, we only wish to acknowledge this line of reasoning. We do not neces-
sarily endorse it. One of us, McKenna (2012), has explicitly argued against it.
11 In this section, we rely on McKenna (2009a).