Mesh, Reasons-Responsive, Leeway Theories 229Russell, Paul. 2002a. “Critical Notice of John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza Respons-
ibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility.” Canadian Journal of Philo-
sophy 32: 587–606.
Watson, Gary. 2001. “Reason and Responsibility.” Ethics 111: 374–94.
For another intriguing way of developing a reasons- responsive compatibilist
view, one that we did not develop in this chapter, see:
Arpaly, Nomy. 2006. Merit, Meaning, and Human Bondage. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Arpaly, Nomy. 2003. Unprincipled Virtue. New York: Oxford University Press.
For efforts to advance an agent- based reasons- responsive source compatibilist
theory (rather than a mechanism- based one like Fischer and Ravizza’s) see:
McKenna, Michael. 2013. “Reasons- Responsiveness, Agents, and Mechanisms.” In
David Shoemaker, ed., Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, vol. 1. New
York: Oxford University Press: 151–84.
Sartorio, Carolina. 2016. Causation and Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
For efforts to advance an agent-based reasons- responsive leeway compatibilist
theory, see:
Brink, David, and Dana Nelkin. 2013. “Fairness and the Architecture of Responsibility.”
In David Shoemaker, ed., Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, vol. 1. Oxford:
Oxford University Press: 284–313.
Nelkin, Dana. 2011. Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Notes
1 In Sections 1 through 7 of this chapter, we draw from McKenna (2011).
2 See, for example, Bratman, 1997, 2002, 2004, 2007; Doris, 2002; Dworkin, 1970,
1988; Frankfurt, 1971; Velleman, 1992, 2002; Watson, 1975.
3 We’ll use this formulation of will in discussing Frankfurt’s work, though his formula-
tion is slightly misleading: An agent’s will might be frustrated. Something might
impede an agent from acting on it (1988: 20). Thus, it is inaccurate to describe it as an
effective first- order desire, one that does move an agent all the way to action. Frank-
furt might formulate what he has in mind this way: An agent’s will is either her
effective first- order desire, or one that, in the absence of external impediments, would
be effective. We are indebted to Ishtiyaque Haji for this point.
4 The natural way to understand the relation is in terms of causation. But Frankfurt
rejects a causal theory of action (1978), despite his compatibilist pedigree. So, let
“bring about” be neutral between causation and some other manner of “moving an
agent all the way to action.”
5 Nailing down Frankfurt’s account of freedom is notoriously difficult given the lan-
guage he used to formulate it. The chart we offer seems to make the best sense of his