240 Contemporary Incompatibilism: Libertarianism
this scenario, we procure as much authorship and control for Ralph as we can,
given that he is making a torn decision. (2010: 97)But first, if, in accord with the event- causal libertarian position,
Ralph decides to move to New Yorkis analyzed as:
Ralph- involving events E1–E2 probabilistically cause Ralph- involving
event E5,Then the luck objections retain their original force. But Balaguer argues that he
can evade this concern by focusing on what the agent does: “if the just- choosing
were done by anything other than the agent, then she would lose authorship and
control” (2010: 97). However, if Ralph’s just- choosing is what secures the
requisite control, and control is fundamentally causal in nature, then what is
required is that a causal relation is obtained between Ralph as agent and the deci-
sion. However, the event- causal libertarian allows only causal relations among
events, and not a causal relation between agent and event.
Kane also sets out a line of defense against the luck objection. First, he points
out that decisions can be undetermined and yet have many features indicative of
agent control and moral responsibility. Undetermined decisions can still be made
voluntarily, intentionally, for reasons, knowingly, on purpose, and as a result of
the agent’s efforts. Agents might not be coerced or compelled if their actions are
indeterministic (Kane 1996: 179, 1999: 237–9). Thus an action’s having an inde-
terministic causal history is consistent with significant control in action, and,
Kane contends, with control sufficient for moral responsibility.
One might object that while indeterminism allows for these features of control
in action, compatibilists can appeal to the same features as a defense against the
objection that causal determination rules out the control required for moral
responsibility. Because incompatibilists deny that causally determined action can
feature enough control for responsibility, one might question whether Kane’s
first strategy can be successful. In accord with this observation, the critic can
argue that while the event- causal view can secure as much control as compatibi-
lism does, still, agents would have no more control over their actions than they
would if determinism were true, and such control isn’t enough for moral respons-
ibility (Clarke, 2003; Pereboom, 2001, 2014).
This objection might be clarified by turning to Kane’s UR (for “ultimate
responsibility”), which specifies his key conditions for moral responsibility. UR
has two elements (1996: 35). The first is that to be ultimately responsible for an
event, an agent must have voluntarily been able to do otherwise. The second is
that to be ultimately responsible for an event, an agent must be responsible for
any sufficient ground or cause or explanation of the event. If actions are undeter-
mined events, then the first component of UR might be satisfied, and agents