Contemporary Incompatibilism: Skeptical Views 277that a serial killer was not blameworthy due to a degenerative brain disease, we
could still agree that his actions are morally very bad. Second, one might contend
that if determinism precludes basic desert blameworthiness, it also undermines
judgments of moral obligation. Because “ought” implies “can,” and if, for
instance, because determinism is true one could not have avoided acting badly, it
must be false that one ought to have acted otherwise. And given that an action is
wrong for an agent just in case he is morally obligated not to perform it, deter-
minism would also undermine judgments of moral wrongness (Haji, 1998). All
of this may be, but such reasoning does not also issue a challenge to judgments
of moral goodness and badness (Haji, 1998; Pereboom, 2013, 2014). So, in
general, free will skepticism can accommodate judgments of moral goodness
and badness, which are arguably sufficient for moral practice.
Third, one might object that if we stopped treating people as if they were
blameworthy in the basic desert sense, we might be left with inadequate
resources for addressing bad behavior (Nichols, 2007; for a response, see Pere-
boom, 2009a). But the free will skeptic can turn instead to other senses of moral
responsibility that have not been a focus of the free will debate. Free will skep-
tics like Joseph Priestley (1788/1965), and their revisionary compatibilist cousins
such as Moritz Schlick (1939) and J.J.C. Smart (1963), claim that given deter-
minism a forward- looking kind of moral responsibility can be retained. On the
version of this position Pereboom endorses (Pereboom, 2013), when we encoun-
ter apparently immoral behavior, it is legitimate to invite the agent to evaluate
critically what his actions indicate about his intentions and character, to demand
apology, or to request reform. Engaging in such interactions is reasonable in
view of the light of those wronged or threatened by wrongdoing to protect them-
selves from immoral behavior and its consequences. We also have an interest in
his moral formation, and the address described naturally functions as a stage in
this process. In addition, we might have a stake in reconciliation with the wrong-
doer, and calling him to account in this way might serve as a step toward realiz-
ing this aim. The main thread of the historical free will debate does not pose
determinism as a challenge to moral responsibility conceived in this way, and
free will skeptics can accept that we are morally responsible in this sense.
11.8.2. Criminal Behavior
Does free will skepticism have resources adequate for contending with criminal
behavior?^5 According to retributivism, punishment of a criminal is justified for
the reason that he deserves something bad to happen to him—pain, deprivation,
or death—just because he has knowingly done wrong (Kant, 1797/1965; Moore,
1987, 1998). Retributivism excludes appeal to goods such as the safety of
society, or the moral improvement of the criminal in justifying punishment.
Rather, the good by which retributivism justifies punishment, or the principle of
right action that justifies punishment, is that an agent receive what he deserves
only because of his having knowingly done wrong. This position would be
undermined if the free will skeptic is right, since if agents do not deserve blame