Revisionism and Some Remaining Issues 301Bill indeed features a vivid concrete description of the deliberative reasoning
process that results in his decision to kill his wife and children. More generally,
Nelkin’s approach suggests that the folk derive varying judgments from an
underlying invariantist theory together with natural but perhaps unjustified theor-
etical and empirical assumptions.^13
In addition, Nelkin suggests that sometimes varying judgments can be derived
from the invariantist theories themselves without any controversial empirical
judgments. Consider a survey that indicates variation in how subjects judge
agents who act with significant emotion. David Pizarro et al. (2003) presented
one group of subjects with a story about a morally exemplary action:—“Because
of his overwhelming and uncontrollable sympathy, Jack impulsively gave the
homeless man his only jacket even though it was freezing outside”—and another
group with this story about a bad action: “Because of his overwhelming and
uncontrollable anger, Jack impulsively smashed the window of the car parked in
front of him because it was parked too close to his.” Cases were also presented
in which the agent instead acts “calmly and deliberately.” Subjects judged agents
much less blameworthy when they acted badly with emotion relative to acting
badly without. But in the case of good action the difference was negligible.
Nelkin suggests, however, that this difference is explained by an invariantist
theory of the sort she herself defends, according to which moral responsibility
crucially requires the ability to act for good reasons (Nelkin, 2007, 2011; Wolf,
1990). In the case of a good action, the emotion tends to highlight the good
reason, while in the case of a bad action, the emotion obscures the good reason,
and consequently can be viewed as an excuse.
A further line of objection can be advanced by reflecting on other empirical
surveys. Consider a much- publicized study in which Danziger et al. (2011) sur-
veyed rulings Israeli judges made during three subsequent sessions in the course
of a day, each of which was followed by a food break. The investigators found
that “the percentage of favorable rulings drops gradually from ≈65% to nearly
zero within each decision session and returns abruptly to ≈65% after a break.”
Upon reflection upon this result, it may seem obvious that the pattern does not
reflect competence, so obvious that additional empirical surveys are not required
to settle whether it does. Imagine that further studies found systematic racial bias
in criminal sentencing. It seems obvious that no studies could show that such
racial bias reflects competence, and, moreover, that no studies are needed to
show that it reflects incompetence. On one account, we know this just by virtue
of competence with the ground rules of morality.
12.5. Religion and Free Will
We end this book with the issue that instigated the free will debate: Whether free
will is compatible with the existence of a providential God.^14 In the monotheistic
tradition beginning with the Stoics, true providence requires theological deter-
minism. Theological determinism is the position that God is the sufficient active
cause of everything in creation, whether directly or by way of secondary causes