Bibliography 325Vargas, Manuel. 2009. “Revision about Free Will: A Statement and Defense.” Philosoph-
ical Studies 144: 45–62.
Vargas, Manuel. 2007. “Revisionism” and “Response to Fischer, Kane, and Pereboom.”
In J. Fischer, R. Kane, D. Pereboom, and M. Vargas, Four Views on Free Will.
Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Vargas, Manuel. 2005a. “The Revisionist’s Guide to Responsibility.” Philosophical
Issues 125: 399–429.
Vargas, Manuel. 2005b. “The Trouble with Tracing.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29:
269–91.
Vargas, Manuel. 2004. “Responsibility and the Aims of Theory: Strawson and Revision-
ism.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85: 218–41.
Velleman, J. David. 2002. “Identification and Identity.” In Sarah Buss and Lee Overton,
eds., Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press: 91–123.
Velleman, J. David. 1992. “What Happens When Someone Acts?” Mind 101: 462–81.
Vihvelin, Kadri. 2013. Causes, Laws, & Free Will: Why Determinism Doesn’t Matter.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Vihvelin, Kadri. 2008. “Foreknowledge, Frankfurt, and the Ability to do Otherwise: A
Reply to Fischer.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (3): 343–72.
Vihvelin, Kadri. 2004. “Free Will Demystified: A Dispositional Account.” Philosophical
Topics 32: 427–50.
Vihvelin, Kadri. 1988. “The Modal Argument for Incompatibilism.” Philosophical
Studies 53: 227–44.
Viney, Wayne. 1993. A History of Psychology: Ideas and Context. Boston, MA: Allyn
and Bacon.
Wallace, R. Jay. 1994. Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Waller, Bruce. 2014. The Stubborn System of Moral Responsibility. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
Waller, Bruce. 2011. Against Moral Responsibility. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Waller, Bruce. 1990. Freedom without Responsibility. Philadelphia, PA: Temple Univer-
sity Press.
Waller, Bruce. 1985. “Deliberating about the Inevitable.” Analysis 45: 48–52.
Warfield, Ted. 2000. “Causal Determinism and Human Freedom are Incompatible.”
Philo sophical Perspectives 14: 167–80.
Warfield, Ted. 1996. “Determinism and Moral Responsibility are Incompatible.” Philo-
sophical Topics 24: 215–26.
Watkins, Eric. 2005. Kant and the Metaphysics of Causality. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
Watson, Gary. 2014. “Peter Strawson on Responsibility and Sociality.” In David Shoe-
maker and Neal A. Tognazzini, eds., Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, vol.
2: “Freedom and Resentment” at 50. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 15–32.
Watson, Gary. 2004. Agency and Answerability. New York: Oxford University Press.
Watson, Gary, ed., 2003. Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press.
Watson, Gary. 2001. “Reason and Responsibility.” Ethics 111: 374–94.
Watson, Gary. 1999. “Soft Libertarianism and Hard Compatibilism.” Journal of Ethics 3
(4): 351–65.
Watson, Gary. 1996. “Two Faces of Responsibility.” Philosophical Topics 24 (2):
227–48.