2 The Free Will Problem
It is often remarked that the free will question is one of the classic problems of
philosophy. The basic insight giving rise to the problem is easy to state. It
appears that free will is in tension with determinism, that one cannot consistently
believe that persons have free will and that determinism is true. Yet we have
reason to believe both. It looks as if something has to go, and so we face a
problem. Here, then, is a first pass at formulating the problem:
- Determinism is true.
- At least some persons have free will.
- Free will is incompatible with determinism.
What makes the problem of free will a classic problem of philosophy is that it
can be framed as a set of mutually inconsistent propositions, each of which there
is independently good reason to accept. The philosopher’s task in the face of this
inconsistency is to resolve it. What must be given up, if anything must (some
problems, after all, are merely apparent), is to be settled by what is true and what
is false. And this is achieved by examining the best arguments for and against
the various propositions comprising the problem set.
This chapter is devoted first to motivating and then formulating the free will
problem. In doing so, we will identify several forms and dimensions of the
problem. As the discussion unfolds, what will become apparent is that different
issues emerge insofar as there are different ways of thinking about free will. Yet
a further variable is the way determinism as well as indeterminism figure into
the elements that generate the problem.
We’ll begin with a section explaining compatibilism and incompatibilism,
and the free- will-accepting and the free- will-denying versions of incompatibi-
lism. Then, before turning our attention to developing the free will problem, we
will motivate it by considering first the appeal of free will and then the appeal of
determinism. It is one thing to recognize a conceptual puzzle or problem, but it
is another to see the motivation for why it is important to solve it. Our intention
is to convey that what is in dispute engages dimensions of our self- understanding
and our conception of the natural world in a way that matters. Something
considerable is at stake. Once we have shown this, we will then turn to the free