The Free Will Problem 37endorse the reality of free will, and if one assumed that free will was incompati-
ble with determinism, then the reality of free will would threaten the truth of
determinism.^6 Restricted just to considerations of human behavior, the reality of
free will would commit one to the claim that some aspects of human conduct
could not be fully explained solely in terms of physical, mechanistic states and
events.^7 Would this be a lamentable result? Maybe determinism, while a plaus-
ible thesis, has a significant downside, and in light of the value and importance
attached to free will (and attendant concepts such as moral responsibility, crea-
tivity, etc.), proving determinism false, by proving true both incompatibilism
and the reality of free will, would be all to the good.
But there is also value in preserving the open- minded attitude that perhaps
determinism (in some form) is true. It is a theoretical value that embraces unifi-
cation and breadth in explanatory scope. To the extent that our best scientific
theories of the natural world are capable of bringing as much of nature as pos-
sible within the umbrella of a single explanatory framework, it is perhaps better
that some aspect of human conduct not be partitioned off from that framework.
There is a respected tradition in some philosophical quarters of acting as a con-
ceptual aid to the sciences, clearing the way for science to incorporate within its
sphere as much of human nature as possible. Philosophy’s role here can be
understood as aiding in the development of the scientific image of the human
condition. Valuing the tenability of determinism as applied to human conduct is
consistent with the cultivation of this image.
2.3. Free Will Problems
We can now begin to attend with some care to an examination of the free will
problem. Return to our initial formulation of it, which, we noted, was too simple
and so masked too much:
- Determinism is true.
- At least some persons have free will.
- Free will is incompatible with determinism.
Call this formulation F1. We’ll now begin to expand on F1 in various ways. To
begin, a more contemporary formulation might also include almost- determinism,
mechanism, and naturalism as we have characterized them. If, as regards human
action, these theses have largely the same influence on action as determinism
proper does, then it would be helpful to incorporate them into the mix. One way
to do this is to amend “determinism” to encapsulate these broader theories of the
natural order. So, treat “determinism*” as the thesis that determinism is true, or
that instead almost- determinism, mechanism, or naturalism is true. We can then
further expand the free will problem with F2 as follows:^8
- Determinism* is true.
- At least some persons have free will.
- Free will is incompatible with determinism*.