50 Classical Compatibilism and Incompatibilism
3.1. The Case for Classical Compatibilism
Classical compatibilism is associated with at least four theses. One proposes a
lean account of freedom. A second declares that the free will problem is illusory
since it rests entirely on a set of conceptual confusions or on the misappropria-
tion of several terms. A third claims that indeterminism would in fact undermine
free will and moral responsibility. A fourth involves an attempt to explain how
an agent could be free to do otherwise even if she were determined to do what
she did. In this section, we’ll discuss the first three. In Section 3.2 we’ll discuss
the fourth.
3.1.1. Classical Compatibilists’ Account of Freedom
According to the classical compatibilist, the free will at issue in the debate is an
agent’s ability to act and to refrain from acting unencumbered, that is, free from
impediments that would stand in her way. The core idea is that free will consists
in the absence of impediments both to making a choice and to refraining from
doing so.
A major component of this conception of free will is the notion of doing what
one wants to do without impediment (a further component, the notion of doing
otherwise without impediment, will be discussed below).^2 Hobbes wrote that a
person’s freedom consists in his finding “no stop, in doing what he has the will,
desire, or inclination to doe.”^3 This notion involves two aspects, a positive and a
negative one. The positive aspect is doing what one wills, desires, or inclines to.
The negative aspect—finding “no stop”—consists in acting unencumbered or
unimpeded. The classical compatibilists’ benchmark of impeded or encumbered
action is compelled action. Compelled action paradigmatically arises when one
is forced by some external source to act contrary to one’s will.
Classical compatibilism is associated with the thesis that the only freedom
worthy of attention is freedom of action, and with the idea of freedom of will
being incoherent.^4 Consider, for example, Locke’s remark about the question of
freedom of will:
I leave it to be considered whether it may not help to put an end to that long
agitated, and I think unreasonable, because unintelligible, question, viz.
whether a man’s will be free, or no. For if I am not mistaken... the question
is itself altogether improper; and it is insignificant to ask, whether a man’s
will be free, as to ask, whether his sleep be swift, or his virtue square: liberty
being as little applicable to will, as swiftness of motion is to sleep, or
squareness to virtue.... Liberty, which is but a power, belongs only to
agents, and cannot be an attribute or modification of the will, which is also
but a power.^5Locke wanted to jettison talk of freedom of will, speaking instead only of the
freedom of agents. Contrary to Locke, however, other classical compatibilists