Classical Compatibilism and Incompatibilism 7119 See, for instance, C.A. Campbell’s direct reply to Schlick, arguing that Schlick’s dis-
tinctions between causal laws and civil compelling laws in no way corrupts the simple
thought that unbroken causal continuity entails that no one could have done other-
wise. It is this plain worry, Campbell protests against Schlick’s charge of a pseudo-
problem, that makes it “really inevitable that the Free Will problem should be
formulated in the way to which Schlick takes exception” (Campbell, 1951, in Berof-
sky, 1966: 113).
20 Readers who are interested in studying the literature on libertarian freedom from the
classical period will find the sort of freedom in dispute, libertarian freedom, referred
to as “contra- causal” freedom. The expression itself is odd, since it suggests some-
thing that is certainly not intended, which is a freedom that is in opposition to what
(otherwise?) would be caused. The meaning of the term, however, is just to be under-
stood in terms of free action or free will that is not causally determined by prior
events. We note that it has fallen out of fashion, as it should have, given how mislead-
ing it is.
21 Notably, we’ll not discuss Kant’s proposed solution. For a discussion of his view, see
Watkins (2005) and Pereboom (2006a).