Retributivism
Retributivism – the crude version
Most people equate retributivism with the slogan ‘an eye for an eye, and a tooth
for a tooth’. Punishment is ‘payback’, or, in more philosophical language,
‘restitution’, a word which has its roots in the idea of repaying a debt. Before
discussing various objections to this version of retributivism it is worth pointing
out the historical origins of the ‘eye for an eye’ doctrine – a doctrine that can be
found in the teachings of the great monotheistic religions: Judaism, Christianity and
Islam. What it meant was that there should be no more thanan eye for an eye, or
a tooth for a tooth. In close-knit communities a slight committed by one person
(or family) against another could lead to a process of blood-letting. The ‘eye for an
eye’ rule meant that punishment could only be meted out by a properly constituted
authority – punishment was not a private matter – and had to be proportional and
intended to break, not continue, a cycle of violence. From retributivism we derive
the concept of lex talionis– equivalence between the crime and the punishment. In
more sophisticated versions of retributivism this does not entail a qualitative identity
of the two: punishment need not literally require taking an eye for an eye.
Even with this clarification it does seem that retribution is little more than
revenge, albeit carried out by a proper authority and not by private individuals.
Furthermore, it does not seem coherent, and for two reasons. First, there cannot
be restitution: executing a murderer does not bring the murdered victim back to
life. Second, often there is no direct match between the crime and the punishment:
how, for example, do you punish treason, or sedition, or the violation of a contract?
There are no equivalents between the criminal act and the punishment. If
retributivism were nothing but an eye for an eye there would be little to be said for
it. However, in the history of legal and political philosophy there have been advanced
much more sophisticated retributivist theories of punishment.Retributivism – the sophisticated versions
The two great figures in the development of retributivism are Immanuel Kant
(1724–1804) and G.W.F. Hegel (1770–1831). Their contributions to retributivist
theory are extensively cited, criticised and developed in contemporary discussions
of punishment. What we offer here is a composite version of the theory, but drawing
mainly on Hegel.
The easiest way to present this version of retributivism is in a series of steps, but
we need first to make a couple of distinctions: (a) between egoism and morality;
(b) between public power and private action:
(a)Egoism versus morality People can act from purely self-interested – that is,
egoistic – reasons, or from a ‘moral law’. For example, why should you not
steal? One answer: because you will be punished if you are caught. This is an
egoistic motivation. An alternative answer to the question might be: you reason
that if everyone stole then property would become insecure – you want your144 Part 1 Classical ideas