Conclusion
We have presented the two dominant justifications for punishment – retributivism
and consequentialism – and a number of ‘compromise’ and alternative theories. No
single theory seems to capture all our everyday intuitions about punishment – that
only the guilty should be punished, that punishment should be equitable and that
the practice should serve a purpose. What is clear is that punishment must be firmly
distinguished from arbitrary violence. This is one of the reasons why many people
feel discomfort towards ‘crude’ retributivism (but we have sought to show that there
are also sophisticated versions of retributivism). The debate over the death penalty
throws into relief many of our attitudes towards punishment – including the issue
of arbitrary violence – which is one of the reasons why it has so often been the
subject of literature and films. In criticising capital punishment we need to ask
whether our objections have implications for the wider practice of punishment.Questions
1 Is capital punishment justified?
2 ‘Murderers should be executed and their organs harvested for transplant
operations’. Do you agree?
3 ‘The logic of consequentialism is the identification of potential criminals and, if
necessary, their incarceration’. Do you agree?
4 Should punishment take the form of compensation of the victim by the criminal?Bibliography
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