see, some theorists attribute the rise of national consciousness to the translation of
the Bible into the vernacular languages of Europe. We shall focus here on the
immediate political impact of the Reformation.
Simplifying a great deal: political power in medieval Europe was characterised
by a dual structure. On the one side there was the spiritual authority of the pontiff,
and on the other his secular equivalent, the Holy Roman Emperor. The latter was
relatively weak, and most secular power resided in the national and city-state
powers. Nonetheless, the loyalties of individual citizens were split between pontiff
and the national (or local) secular powers. Throughout the fourteenth century there
were continual pressures on the Church to reform itself, and this was expressed as
a demand for a general council (a council of lay people) to discuss reform. Although
the Church of Rome was relatively tolerant of doctrinal difference – it only became
‘authoritarian’ after the Reformation – there was a refusal to call a council. Had
such a council been called it is a matter of conjecture whether the schism between
Rome and the various streams of the Reformation would have taken place; but the
fact is that a council was not called, and an institutionalbreak became inevitable.
The religious intolerance that eventually hardened into war cannot be attributed
to the Church of Rome’s attempt to suppress dissent. Rather, the institutional break
created a legitimation crisis for the secular authorities. In states where the prince
(or elector) had embraced Lutheranism or Calvinism, the continuing allegiance of
some of their citizens to Rome was a threat to the prince’s authority. Conversely,
where the prince had remained loyal to Rome but some of his subjects had embraced
Reformed religion there was a loss of spiritual authority – an authority that had
underwritten secular authority in the pre-Reformation period. In addition, the
medieval division of spiritual and secular power had resulted in a dual structure of
law, with much domestic law – for example, marriage – the responsibility of church
courts rather than secular courts. In Reformed states, the legitimacy of that domestic
law was now in question.
The first Europe-wide attempt to address, rather than simply suppress, this
conflict of loyalties was the Treaty of Augsburg (1555), which produced the formula:
cujus regio, eius religio– roughly translated as ‘the ruler determines the religion’.
Two points can be made about this formula. First, it tolerated rulers and not
individual citizens. Second, it was a mere modus vivendi – that is, a way of living
together, but without any underlying respect for the other person’s beliefs or way
of life. It was a recognition of the reality of power: neither could destroy the other,
and it was in neither’s interest for there to be continual war, so they ‘agreed to
disagree’. However, once the balance of power shifted, the newly dominant side
had no reason not to suppress the other. Not surprisingly, the Augsburg settlement
proved unstable, and it took a century more of conflict before the so-called Peace
of Westphalia (1648) created a new, and relatively stable, European order. The
Peace of Westphalia is the name given to a series of treaties that ended the last of
the great Wars of Religion – the Thirty Years War (1618–48). It reaffirmed the
formula of cujus regio, eius religio, but made some concession to toleration of
individuals by respecting the beliefs of those resident in a particular territory prior
to 1618. In addition, there was an implication that private belief and public practice
should be separated – there were to be ‘no windows into men’s souls’, to use
Elizabeth I of England’s expression. So long as there was outward conformity, there
could be inner dissent.176 Part 2 Classical ideologies