criticism. The political consequence of abstract thought, Burke argues, is terror.
Against abstraction, theory and dogma, Burke defends habit, taste and prejudice.
The concept of prejudice is the single most important concept in Burke’s conservative
political theory. Today, ‘prejudice’ is a pejorative term, so it is important to
understand how Burke uses it. A prejudice is a pre-judgement, or a judgement made
without recourse to theoretical abstractions; in contemporary philosophical language
we might use the term ‘intuition’ rather than prejudice. For Burke, the wisdom of
other people, including previous generations, is a resource that must be respected
if we are to avoid disastrous social consequences. The main thrust of Burke’s
Reflections on the Revolution in Franceis to contrast a society – France – which
has abandoned prejudice in favour of ‘theory’, with a society – Britain – which has
remained close to its traditions, to which it is prejudiced. Burke, claiming to speak
on behalf of his fellow countrymen, observes:
that we have made no discoveries, and we think that no discoveries are to be
made, in morality; not many in the great principles of government, nor in the
ideas of liberty, which were understood long before we were born, altogether as
well as they will be after the grave has heaped its mould upon our presumption,
and the silent tomb shall have imposed its law on our pert loquacity.
(Burke, 1969: 84)
To mid-twentieth-century conservatives, faced with what they termed ‘totalitarian
societies’, Burke seemed ahead of his time, with the terror he predicted would follow
the French Revolution being repeated in a more organised form in Stalin’s Soviet
Union and Hitler’s Germany. However, it should be noted that Burke opposed the
extension of democracy which would take place in the nineteenth century, and
although there are, as John Stuart Mill observed, dangers in majoritarian democracy,
the combination of civil liberties and participatory political structures – what later
political scientists would term the ‘civic culture’ (Almond and Verba, 1963: 5–10)- has served as a bulwark against political authoritarianism. And, of course, while
post-1789 French history has been complex, the Revolution did lay the groundwork
for a strong liberal–democratic system.
Burke, like Hume, rejects the liberal idea that duties – or political obligations –
are derived from a contract. Furthermore, unlike liberals, Burke does not make a
sharp distinction between state and society: the ‘state’ is the political organisation
of society, and for that reason it emerges from society. Although Burke himself does
not pursue this line, a consequence of this argument is that the state has, for many
conservatives, a role in shaping human behaviour, even in what liberals term the
private sphere. The legal moralism of James Fitzjames Stephen and Patrick Devlin
has its roots in a Burkean view of the relationship between state and society.
Although he was highly ecumenical in his religious beliefs – he admired Hinduism,
and defended Irish Catholics – Burke does value religious belief and organisation,
arguing that they are central to a prosperous, stable society.
Burke’s conservatism is often misunderstood. He is sometimes assumed to be a
straightforward reactionary. Yet his interventions on policy towards the American
colonies, India and Ireland, would suggest he was, in the context of his time, a
progressive. In addition, he argued strongly for parliamentary control over the
Crown. Finally, he was not opposed to all revolutions, maintaining that the Glorious
Revolution of 1688 in England was an historic achievement (although he denied
200 Part 2 Classical ideologies