made through a chain of authorities, such as local, national and supra-national,
then if those decisions are made by majority vote the chances of local interests being
ignored increase with the addition of every link in the chain.
Garrett Hardin and the ethics of the lifeboat
Garrett Hardin (1915–2003) was a highly influential environmentalist. Although
his arguments were neither original, nor profound, there are good reasons for
discussing his work. First, he was concerned with a major issue for environ-
mentalists: population growth (a secondary, but related, issue that concerned him
was immigration to the developed world from the developing world). Second, he
is sometimes, and quite erroneously, labelled an ecologist, as distinct from an
environmentalist, and his arguments are quoted in political debates against
ecologists. Third, he challenged one of the fundamental human rights – the right
to procreate – and, more generally, his work raises important questions about global
justice, questions to which we return in Chapter 22.
Hardin’s most famous essay was ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’, which was based
on a presidential address delivered at a meeting of the Pacific Division of the
American Association for the Advancement of Science at Utah State University in
June 1968. In the following 30 years it was reprinted in many collections, and Hardin
himself revised it several times. The central problem is, by Hardin’s own admission,
not original; indeed, it is simply a statement of the prisoner’s dilemma, which we
discussed in Chapter 8. We are to imagine common lands on which herdsmen graze
their cattle. So long as the numbers of herdsmen and cattle are low the commons
will recover from the effects of grazing, new grass will grow, the cattle will be fed
and the herdsmen will make a living and so not starve. However, if the number of
herdsmen and cattle grow – perhaps because population growth is no longer kept in
check by war and disease – there will come a point at which the commons will not
recover, and indeed deteriorate to the point where even the original low level of
grazing would not be supported. As we saw in our analysis of the prisoner’s dilemma,
even if an individual herdsman recognises the consequences of his actions – that is,
can see clearly the ‘tragedy’ before him – it is in his interests to continue grazing.
Hardin makes a point that appears to echo those of deep ecologists: the harm
from an individual action cannot be ‘pictured’ – the effects may not be discernible
for years, and effects are, in any case, cumulative. Such is the case with the tragedy
of the commons. Morality must take into account the full effects of an action; in
Hardin’s words, it must be ‘system sensitive’. Without questioning the validity of
Hardin’s argument, it is important to distinguish his ‘system’ from that of Leopold
or Næss – the long-term effects which concern Hardin are the effects on humanity.
Hardin’s argument, while concerned with environmental degradation, is thoroughly
anthropocentric.
Almost all moral and political theorists have accepted that actions have to be
assessed against their full consequences, so Hardin’s argument is directed much more
at popular moral beliefs, rather than at previous thinkers – indeed, it is doubtful
that he is aware of the heritage of the arguments he propounds. Hardin argues that
a popular morality focused simply on the rights of individuals, without regard to
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