fundamentalism, not because it is Islamic, but because it will react negatively to a
failing modernity.
Algeria not only offers a classic case study of the conditions which give rise to
(Islamic) fundamentalism, but it also provides a model of how not to deal with the
problem. Zoubir notes that the FIS (Islamic Salvation Front) emerged as the most
mobilised and best-structured party in the country – it was legalised in 1989 despite
its avowed opposition to republican principles (Zoubir, 1998: 143–4). It looked
certain to win the elections in 1992 when the army stepped in, cancelled the elections
and banned the organisation. Since 1992, terrorism and banditry have plagued the
country and successive governments have failed to regain a minimum level of trust
and legitimacy (Zoubir, 1998: 154).
Ali argues that had the FIS been allowed to become the government, then divisions
beneath the surface would have come to the fore. The army could then have warned
that any attempt to tamper with rights guaranteed by the constitution would not
be tolerated (Ali, 2002: 306). This would, at least, have put the argument squarely
in favour of the concept of democracy that the FIS explicitly rejected. In fact, since
the army’s counterproductive action and the mutual escalation of terrorism it has
engendered, faith in the FIS has also been eroded, as Zoubir points out, and the
only concern by Algerians is for civil peace, and physical and economic security
(Zoubir, 1998: 157).
The comparison between the FIS in Algeria and the Islamic Action Front in Jordan
is revealing. It not only shows that there is significant diversity between Islamic
movements even in the Middle East, but reveals the kind of conditions which need
to be present before a fundamentalist movement can take root. Islamic ideology
differs considerably from country to country or movement to movement. It
delineates a wide spectrum of thought, from the transparently ultra-conservative to
a convolution of eclectic liberal ideas. It is thus inappropriate to categorise, as Bina
(1994) puts it, all these movements as ‘fundamentalist’. If applied indiscriminately
the yardstick of fundamentalism runs counter to the very act of reconciliation of
Islam with existing social formations that are, by necessity, transitory and historical
(1994: 17–18). Adherence to Islam, as with other religious movements and
movements in general, necessarily reflects the particular conditions in which
fundamentalism takes root.
Nasser’s Egypt had been a beacon of Arab progressivism. Nasser sought to
destroy the Muslim Brotherhood and his government tried to turn the clerical
graduates of the Islamic University of Al Azhar into mere transmission belts for his
ideology. Nasser treated the Muslim Brotherhood with ‘unexampled brutality’ and
those leaders who had not been hanged, took refuge in oil sheikdoms in the Arabian
Peninsula (Kepel, 1994: 18). In 1966, Sayyid Qutb, a member of the Brotherhood,
was executed: his message, hugely influential, was that true Muslims should break
with the existing world and build a real Islamic state (Kepel, 1994: 20). Armstrong
quotes his comment that ‘Humanity today is living in one large brothel! One only
has to glance at its press, films, fashion shows, beauty contests, ballrooms, wine-
bars, and broadcasting stations’ (Armstrong, 2001: 240). After the traumatic military
defeat by Israel in 1967, Islamic orthodoxy began to gain increasing numbers of
adherents. The sharp increase in the price of oil that followed the Arab–Israeli war
of 1973 accelerated the flight from the countryside.388 Part 3 Contemporary ideologies