Free to believe?

A

rticle 18 of the Universal Declaration of

Human Rights (1948) states that

‘everyone has the right to freedom of

thought, conscience and religion; this right

includes freedom to change his religion or belief,

and freedom, either alone or in community with

others and in public or private, to manifest his

religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship

and observance’. The development of concep-

tions of religious toleration was crucial to the

development of liberalism and religious freedom,

and along with certain prohibitions, on, for

example, slavery and torture, are taken to be

among the most fundamental human rights. But

even in Europe – arguably, the ‘homeland’ of

human rights – the right is restricted: some

European countries do not, for example, permit

the building of mosques with minarets. And

opposition is not based on planning grounds,

but on hostility to a visible Islamic presence.

African scholar Makau Mutua, in a critique

of human rights (2002), argues that the right to

practice one’s religion is sometimes in tension

with the right to proselytise, and as the former

is based on the more fundamental value of self-

determination, it should take priority. This

means it is legitimate to restrict the ‘missionary,

messianic’ religions of Christianity and Islam

from, in effect, continuing their colonialist

projects. Religions do not compete on a level

playing field, and the human rights regime ‘not

only forcibly imposes on African religions the

obligation to compete – a task for which as

nonproselytizing, noncompetitive creeds they are

not historically fashioned – but also protects the

evangelising religions in their march towards

universalisation’ (Mutua, 2002: 94).

• Should religion be accorded the full
  protection of Article 18?

A Christian missionary listening to the confession of a Zairian woman

© Paul Almasy/Corbis