6.The civilly disobedient accept the penalties for lawbreaking Once again, the
reasoning behind this point is that the civilly disobedient are appealing to, rather
than threatening, the majority. Willingness to accept the penalties for lawbreaking
- that is, not resisting arrest – demonstrates sincerity. Such behaviour may
embarrass the majority, who must ask themselves whether they really want to
punish, often in a draconian fashion, clearly peace-loving people.
7.Even if laws are seriously unjust, civil disobedience must not threaten the stability
of the political system The thinking behind this requirement is that a situation
might arise where there are a number of groups justifiably engaged in civil
disobedience, but the conjoint effects of their actions threaten the stability of the
political system. In such a situation groups must show restraint. Although it is
rather unrealistic, Rawls suggests that civilly disobedient groups might come to
an agreement whereby groups take it in turns engaging in civil disobedience. One
might wonder whether a political system that provokes so much civil disobedience
is even partially just, but he may have in mind the United States in the 1960s,
when there were civil rights actions andanti-Vietnam War actions.
8.Civil disobedience takes place within fidelity to law This underwrites the entire
project of civil disobedience. The civilly disobedient do not seek to bring down
the existing system, but rather they want to strengthen it by removing injustice,
such that the system will win the loyalty of all citizens. In this sense the civilly
disobedient demonstrate fidelity – or faithfulness – to the law.
We round off our outline of Rawls’s theory with a discussion of his distinction
between civil disobedience and conscientious refusal.
Conscientious refusal
A distinction can be made between disobedience on general moral grounds, and
disobedience on the narrower – but still moral – ground of injustice. Rawls’s aim
in A Theory of Justice was to articulate a morality – a ‘theory of justice’ –
appropriate to the political sphere. That political morality leaves open many other
areas of morality. Conscientious refusal may be grounded in that political morality,
but it need not be; it may be based on ‘religious or other principles at variance with
the constitutional order’ (Rawls, 1972: 369). The clearest modern example of
conscientious refusal is objection to military service, either for general pacifist
reasons or because of opposition to a particular war. Rawls argues that such
objections cannot be automaticallyaccepted, for justice requires on occasion that
people be prepared to defend – by force of arms – the political system. However,
he concedes that the spirit of pacifism accords with the values underlying a just
society – it is rare for nearly just societies to go to war against one another (this is
the so-called democratic peace argument). He also argues that an unjust war – a
war that violates the laws of peoples – can quite properly be the object of civil
disobedience.
Conscientious refusal cannot be an appeal to the sense of justice of the majority.
The danger with conscientious refusal is that it undermines the political order by
substituting individual moral judgement for the collective judgement of society. An
example would be the refusal to pay taxes that go towards the development and
Chapter 19 Civil disobedience 433