than an explicitly authoritarian one, but what makes the state inherently arbitrary
is its use of force.
In the same way, the political theorist Dagger (1997: 94) does not recognise that
forcing a person to be free is not simply a Rousseauian paradox: it is inherent within
the state itself. Dagger, like Pettit, sees dangers in the criminal law but argues that
while civic virtue is a positive good, punishment may be a necessary evil (1997:
79). The point is that the state is here to stay. This surely is the nub of the problem.
Whether liberalism is accepted (as it is by Dagger) or rejected (by Pettit in favour
of republicanism, a view that individuals should participate in politics), political
violence can never be eliminated if we continue to rely upon an institution claiming
a monopoly of legitimate force. (See Chapter 7 for a discussion of punishment.)
Chomsky has spoken of the unmentionable but far more extreme political
violence of the powerful against the weak (2003: 7), but such an analysis is only
possible when we see the state as an institutional expression of political violence
itself. It is true that if powerful states would stop participating in political violence
abroad, that would reduce the amount of political violence in the world by an
enormous quantity (Chomsky, 2003: 20). Taking the official US government’s
definition of political violence – the use of violence to achieve political, religious or
other ends through intimidation – are we not entitled to ask as to whether Israel’s
invasion of the Lebanon was not a ‘textbook example’ of political violence thus
defined (Chomsky, 2003: 52)?The significance of September 11th
Nothing that has been argued so far suggests that force should not be used when
innocent civilians are cruelly and heartlessly destroyed as happened on September
11th. The point is that using political violence against political violence is dangerous
and can easily be counterproductive, for remember that, according to our critique,
the state itself is a violent institution that uses violence against violence. This is
always a risky business.
Chomsky argues that the leader of the ‘War against Terror’ is the only state in
the world that has been condemned by the World Court for international political
violence (2003: 50). Friedlander describes political violence as war and ‘combating
it is also war’ (1979: 237), but might this kind of posture lead to the kind of laws
that alienate not only civil libertarians, but citizens generally? Political violence has
been defined in the PATRIOT Act passed in October 2001 in the USA in such a
way that it could incorporate simple acts of civil disobedience.
Howard Zinn in his Terrorism and War(2002) contends that US foreign policy
has promoted and provoked political violence. He cites a Defense Science Board
that acknowledges the link between US involvement in international situations and
the increase in violent attacks (2002: 9). His argument is that if you look at the
death and indiscriminate bombing which has occurred, then it is impossible to avoid
the conclusion that, for example, the USA is using violence against, even ‘terrorizing
Afghanistan’ (2002: 11). He argues that ‘we have to broaden our definition of
political violence, or else we will denounce one political violence and accept another’
(2002: 16). We must allow for the extension of the concept of political violence to460 Part 4 Contemporary ideas