It is argued by Weedon that postmodernism represents a ‘position’ whereas
poststructuralism is merely a method of critique which could be used in the struggle
for change (Hughes, 2002: 65). If this is correct, then poststructuralism can avoid
the pessimism, scepticism, relativism of which postmodernists are often accused.
But whatever term we use, the notion of difference, as presented by Jacques Derrida,
contains the idea that we should link dissimilarity with the need to defer meaning.
For Derrida, the term ‘différance’ is a fusion of two senses of the French word
‘différer’ – to be different and to defer (Abrams, 1999: 57). The significance of a
particular phenomenon can never come to rest in an actual ‘presence’ – by which
is meant a language-independent reality. This is a complicated way of saying that
we can never understand and empathise with a person’s particular attributes, since
all meanings are subject to infinite regress. Every phenomenon is different from
every other and it is impossible to ‘decide’ what anything ‘really’ means. It is true
that differences are infinite – try counting a person’s differences, the colour of their
eyes, their skin, their health, their religion, etc. – and you will soon find that you
could go on forever. But each of these differences can only be identified, because
you yourself are a fellow human and, therefore, have something in common.
The idea that being different makes it impossible to have things in common,
reflects a sceptical view of the world so that no one can understand anyone else (or
even themselves). This kind of scepticism is actually very old, and arises because
reality or truth is seen as something that is static and unchanging. Once you discover
that the world changes, and that what is here is gone tomorrow, you then deny
that reality exists at all. All meanings are deemed arbitrary and purely relative to
the language we use. Because meaning cannot be an unchanging absolute truth, it
is then argued that it cannot be established at all, but must be ‘deferred’. This, of
course, makes it impossible to come to a position in which we show respect for
diversity and insist that identities are multiple both between and within people. To
respect diversity is to link it to something that we all share. If difference is interpreted
in a way that excludes what we have in common – ‘sameness’ – then its real
significance cannot be established.
But is this not a rather airy-fairy argument that has no practical importance? Its
importance arises from the assumption that we cannot, according to Derrida,
distinguish between identities that have validity and those that do not. It is certainly
true that differences can be used to discriminate and dominate, and poststructuralists
are right to argue that one identity should not be privileged, or as we have said
above, treated as dominant. Women, for example, are clearly different from men.
But what does this undeniable difference mean? Does it mean that men are entitled
to dominate women, and regard themselves as superior? Feminists have been
understandably preoccupied with difference because they seek to argue that there
is no justification for using differences between men and women as the basis for
discrimination and exclusion. Women may be different from men, but in general
they are no better and no worse. It does not follow, however, that the differences
are all unreal, and that they are arbitrary social ‘constructs’. We would argue that
the difference between men and women is bothconstructed socially and naturally
based, and it would be wrong to argue that differences would have to be erased
before domination ceases.
Poststructuralists sometimes reject what they call ‘meta-narratives’. They see
these as stories that want to be more than mere stories on the grounds that, in the
Chapter 21 Difference 471