developed than its tendency to break and control the vio-
lence of faction. The friend of popular governments never
finds himself so much alarmed for their character and
fate as when he contemplates their propensity to this
dangerous vice. He will not fail, therefore, to set a due
value on any plan which, without violating the principles
to which he is attached, provides a proper cure for it. The
instability, injustice, and confusion introduced into the
public councils have, in truth, been the mortal diseases
under which popular governments have everywhere
perished, as they continue to be the favorite and fruit-
ful topics from which the adversaries to liberty derive
their most specious declamations. The valuable improve-
ments made by the American constitutions on the popu-
lar models, both ancient and modern, cannot certainly
be too much admired; but it would be an unwarrantable
partiality to contend that they have as effectually obvi-
ated the danger on this side, as was wished and expected.
Complaints are everywhere heard from our most consid-
erate and virtuous citizens, equally the friends of public
and private faith and of public and personal liberty, that
our governments are too unstable, that the public good
is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, and that
measures are too often decided, not according to the rules
of justice and the rights of the minor party, but by the
superior force of an interested and overbearing majority.
However anxiously we may wish that these complaints
had no foundation, the evidence of known facts will not
permit us to deny that they are in some degree true. It
will be found, indeed, on a candid review of our situation,
that some of the distresses under which we labor have
been erroneously charged on the operation of our govern-
ments; but it will be found, at the same time, that other
causes will not alone account for many of our heaviest
misfortunes; and, particularly, for that prevailing and
increasing distrust of public engagements and alarm for
private rights which are echoed from one end of the con-
tinent to the other. These must be chiefly, if not wholly,
effects of the unsteadiness and injustice with which a
factious spirit has tainted our public administration.
Madison now defines what he means by the term faction.
By a faction I understand a number of citizens,
whether amounting to a majority or minority of the
whole, who are united and actuated by some common363
In 1787, after the newly drafted U.S. Constitution was sub-
mitted to the thirteen states for ratification, a major politi-
cal debate ensued between the Federalists (who favored
ratification) and the Anti- Federalists (who opposed rati-
fication). Anti-Federalists in New York were particularly
critical of the Constitution, and in response to their objec-
tions, Federalists Alexander Hamilton, James Madison,
and John Jay wrote a series of eighty-five essays in defense
of the Constitution. The essays were published in New York
newspapers and reprinted in other newspapers throughout
the country.
For students of American government, the essays, col-
lectively known as the Federalist Papers, are particularly
important because they provide a glimpse of the found-
ers’ political philosophy and intentions in designing the
Constitution—and, consequently, in shaping the American
philosophy of government.
We have included in this appendix two of these essays:
Federalist Papers No. 10 and No. 51. Each essay has been
annotated by the authors to indicate its importance in
American political thought and to clarify the meaning of
particular passages.Federalist Paper No. 10
Federalist Paper No. 10, penned by James Madison, has
often been singled out as a key document in American
political thought. In this essay, Madison attacks the Anti-
Federalists’ fear that a republican form of government will
inevitably give rise to “factions”—small political parties
or groups united by a common interest—that will control
the government. Factions will be harmful to the country
because they will implement policies beneficial to their
own interests but adverse to other people’s rights and to the
public good. In this essay, Madison attempts to lay to rest
this fear by explaining how, in a large republic such as the
United States, there will be so many different factions, held
together by regional or local interests, that no single one of
them will dominate national politics.
Madison opens his essay with a paragraph discussing
how important it is to devise a plan of government that can
control the “instability, injustice, and confusion” brought
about by factions.
Among the numerous advantages promised by a well-
constructed Union, none deserves to be more accuratelyAppendix C
Federalist Papers
No. 10 and No. 51
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