they act as if it’s a bear. This is not the same as visualising the bear; nor is
it the same as simply supposing (entertaining the proposition) that the
stump is a bear. An important feature of make-believe is that, unlike sensory
imagination, it can occur at a group level. I can play a make-believe game
of catch with a friend, and our imagination is focused and unified around
the game–indeed, the game may require both of us in order to function;
but if we were both merely to visualise a ball, there would be little that
our imaginings would have in common. The idea that artworks offer us a
kind of unified, rule-bound way to make believe (including as a group) is
a central tenet of Kendall Walton’s highly influentialMimesis as Make-
Believe. Ever since the publication of that book, the notion of play-acting
or make-believe has had an important place in philosophical discussions
of art and aesthetics. This is certainly not restricted to theatre: Walton’s
view is meant to extend to paintings and novels as well as to photos and
films. This is not the occasion to enter into the details of Walton’s theory.
Readers should note that Walton’s notion of‘make-believe’, although it
begins with examples of the children’s games like the bear-stump game
(the example is his), has a broader application. Hence, for Walton, anyone
looking at any picture is engaging in make-believe.^52
Setting aside Walton’s specific use of the term‘make-believe’ in his
general theory of the arts, then, it seems to me that‘make-believe’, in its
everyday use, gives an emphasis onactionas a response to what is ima-
gined, which doesn’t quite get the audience’s response right. When we
see the actor playing Oedipus appear on the stage, we’re not meant to
take part or get involved. Indeed, the standard notion of make-believe
looks like a better description of what the actor is doing than what the
audience is doing. That would suggest that the audience is perhaps
watchinga kind of make-believe; but, because they play no part in the
action, their imaginary participation doesn’t seem best characterised as
make-believe or play-acting. Nonetheless, what is useful about this term
(in relation tomimesisand theatre) is that it reminds us of the sense in
which, at a typical theatrical performance, we’re all ‘in on it’.Iam
reluctant to characterise an audience as‘playing a game’at the theatre;
but it is certainly involved in a kind of group pretence–even if that pretence
does not require acting or responding in the manner suggested by the
term‘make-believe’.
The relationship between imagination and imitation
We began this chapter with Plato, noticing that theatre looks to require
two different kinds ofmimesis: imitation and imagination.^53 On the one
hand, things on stage look like their real-life counterparts. On the other
hand, theatre requires pretence, imagination of various kinds, perhaps
40 From the World to the Stage