were there not also the practice of describing both the looks and feeling
states of human beings in these terms. It is true that the possession of a
contour or“look”that is expressive of sadness does notentailthat either a
work or a person that has that look is in fact feeling sadness.^80 Persons can
feign looks, and works of art do not themselves have feelings. Moreover, it is
true that expressive predicates do in the first instance describe looks, con-
tours, or physiognomies.^81 But“any attempt to save [pure physiognomic
similarity theories] by‘eliminating’descriptions of artistic acts [of artists
doing something in making the work] in favor of‘logically equivalent’
descriptions of formal elements and/or represented subject matter is doomed
to fail.”^82 Like grimaces and cries, works of art have expressive properties
because they are the products of what human beings in generaldo.
Sircello’s emphasis on the importance of artisticactsof making the work
allows him to capture the importance ofpoint of viewin presentation of a
subject matter as a focus for thought and perception. To cite just two of his
many examples:
Wedding Dance in the Open Airis an ironic painting because Bruegheltreatsthe
gaiety of the wedding scene ironically.
Prokoviev’s Grandfather theme is witty because the composer wittily
commentson the character.^83
These works would not have the expressive physiognomic qualities that they
have, nor would these qualities be available to us and be of interest, were it
not the case that the painter or composer from a point of viewputthem there
and made a point of view on what is presented available to us. In each case,
“the respective anthropomorphic predicate is applied to the work of art in
virtue of what the artistdoesin that work.”^84
A pure physiognomic similarity theory of expression that makes no refer-
ence to artistic acts and points of view also has difficulty in explaining
why we want to read or listen to or look at a work of artagain. In emphasiz-
ing as Goodman doesonlythe invitation by the work to attend to a new set of
comparisons among looks, surfaces, contours, and so forth of things,
such theories construe the presence of expressive qualities as primarily a
matter of cognitive interest. As Roger Scruton observes against Goodman,
(^80) See Sircello,Mind and Art, p. 46. (^81) Ibid. (^82) Ibid.
(^83) Ibid., p. 25. (^84) Ibid., p. 26.
Expression 101