than we had thought). Some conceptual art lacks a conspicuous and obvious
expressive dimension (even if it can be argued that wit and austerity of
thought are expressive values that are embodied some works or that some
works produce flickers of aesthetic interest). When all of these three dimen-
sions–the representational, the formal, and the expressive–are either
absent or at least not conspicuously present, then we tend to say that the
object or action in question is not a work of art but rather a manufactured
commodity or a routine action (not a performance) in the service of a more
fully preplanned end. If a claim to art is nonetheless made on its behalf, then
we require a special story about how this object or act (a thumbtack? a
solving of a crossword puzzle?), in all its ordinariness, nonetheless counts.
If such claims succeed, as they sometimes can, then that will typically be
because it can be made out that the object or act in question possesses more
representationality, formal interest, and expressiveness than had first met
the eye or ear.
If this definition–a work of art presents a subject matter as a focus for
thought and emotional attitude, distinctively fused to the imaginative
exploration of material–is right, then it must help us to be clearer about
what we are doing in making and attending to art and about why making and
attending to art matter to us. It must, in particular, among other things play
some role in identifying and evaluating works. It must sum up usefully the
general kinds of things we do and might say in arguing the merits of a
particular case: it must specify our criteria. Because, however, the criteria
are multiple, because they are differently satisfiable in different media and
against the backgrounds of different traditions and social contexts, and
because special, innovative stories about how they might be satisfied are
possible, this definition will not enable us to settle difficult cases of identifi-
cation and evaluation sharply and unambiguously.^2 We will naturally have
different ways as artists of undertaking to satisfy these criteria and different
readinesses as members of an audience to respond to different strategies for
their satisfaction. We can hope to talk out some different responses in
critical conversation and so come to see more of another’s point in respond-
ing to the work,^3 but it is unlikely that there will be universal agreement in
either interpretation or evaluation.(^2) See Chapter 7 above.
(^3) See Chapters 6 and 7 above.
286 An Introduction to the Philosophy of Art