object’s aspects is, Goodman claims, of no use. In undertaking to reproduce
an aspect visually, we areconstruingan object, identifying its look not“in
itself,”but in relation to our purposes, habits, and interests. Hence“in
representing an object [visually] we do not copy such a construal or interpret-
ation–weachieveit.”^22 Goodman adds that this is as much true for the
camera as it is for the pen or brush.“The choice and handling of the
instrument participate in the construal.”^23 Hence, Goodman concludes,
visual representation (like all object construal) is conventionalized through-
and-through. Rather than resting on resemblance, depiction is a matter of
the use of a certain kind of conventionalized scheme for achievingdenotation.
In a painting or photograph there are no differentiable, repeatable char-
acters (such as letters or words in linguistic representations); every small
difference in marking can make a difference to what is represented (which
aspect is presented); and every aspect of the mark itself matters. In Good-
man’s terminology, visual representation in painting and photography is a
syntactically dense, semantically dense, and relatively replete way of denot-
ing or referring to something.^24 That is, it is different from denoting by
means of using language, which is syntactically and semantically discontinu-
ous, in having differentiable and repeatable letters and words. But visual
representation is nonetheless a conventionalized means of denoting, and it
has the usual primarily cognitive interest of denotations generally.“Denota-
tion is the core of representation and is independent of resemblance.”^25
Visual representation as dense and relatively replete denotation is one way
of achieving and communicating a construal of things.
Against Goodman and in favor of resemblance theory, Goldman has objected
that Goodman’s examples of resemblers that do not represent (identical twins;
peas in a pod) do not touch the definition of visual representation in terms of
resemblance, since these things were not made with the intention to create a
visual experience in viewers.^26 But this objection against Goodman misses the
mark, for–Goodman can argue–how can the intention to create a depictive
visual experiencearise and be realized except through the use of a conventional-
ized language of dense and relatively replete denotation? It is through the use of
such a language that visual resemblance that is relevant to presenting an object
is defined. Depiction-relevant resemblances between objects to be represented
(^22) Ibid., p. 9. (^23) Ibid., p. 9, n. 8. (^24) Ibid., pp. 226–30. (^25) Ibid., p. 5.
(^26) Goldman,“Representation: Conceptual and Historical Overview,”p. 137B.
Representation, imitation, and resemblance 33