REPUBLIC(BOOKIV) 91
“We’re going to claim that,” he said.
“And the one is for drink, the other for food?”
“Yes.”
“Now to the extent that it’s thirst, would it be a desire in the soul for anything
beyond that of which we say it’s a desire? For instance, is thirst a thirst for a hot drink
or a cold one, or a big or a little one, or in a word, for any particular sort of drink? Or, if
there’s any heat present in addition to the thirst, wouldn’t that produce an additional
desire for cold, or if cold is present, a desire for heat? And if by the presence of magni-
tude the thirst is a big one, that will add a desire for a big drink, or of smallness, for a lit-
tle one? But being thirsty itself will never turn into a desire for anything other than the
very thing it’s naturally for, for drink, or being hungry in turn for food?”
“It’s like that,” he said; “each desire itself is only for the very thing it’s naturally
for, while the things attached to it are for this or that sort.”
“Then let’s not be unprepared, and let someone get us confused, on the grounds
that no one desires drink, but decent quality drink, and not food but decent quality food,
since everyone, after all, desires good things. So if thirst is a desire, it would be for a
decent quality of drink, or of whatever else it’s a desire for, and the same way with the
other desires.”
“Well, maybe there could seem to be something in what he’s saying,” he said,
“when he says that.”
“But surely,” I said, “with all such things that are related to something, the
ones that are of particular kinds are related to something of a particular kind, as it
seems to me, while the sorts that are just themselves are related only to something
that’s just itself.”
“I don’t understand,” he said.
“Don’t you understand,” I said, “that what’s greater is of such a sort as to be
greater than something?”
“Certainly.”
“Than a lesser thing?”
“Yes.”
“And a much greater thing than one that’s much less, right?”
“Yes.”
“And also a thing that was greater than one that was less, and a thing that’s going
to be greater than one that’s going to be less?”
“Yes, of course,” he said.
“And something more numerous is related to something that’s fewer, and some-
thing twice as many to something that’s half as many, and all that sort of thing, and also
something heavier to something lighter and faster to slower, and in addition, hot things
are related to cold things, and isn’t everything like that the same way?”
“Very much so.”
“And what about the kinds of knowledge? Aren’t they the same way? Knowledge
just by itself is knowledge of what’s learnable just by itself, or of whatever one ought to
set down knowledge as being of, while a particular knowledge or a particular sort is of
a particular thing or a particular sort of thing. I mean this sort of thing: when a knowl-
edge of constructing houses came into being, didn’t it differ from the other kinds of
knowledge so that it got called housebuilding?”
“Certainly.”
“And wasn’t that because it’s a particular kind of knowledge, and any of the
others is a different sort?”
“Yes.”
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