INTRODUCTION 1067
nexus of exotic experiences of perception and pleasure valuation.” Of this nexus of
intending tree-experiences I amcertain. By no longer referring to objective exis-
tence, by applying the phenomenological <epoche ̄>instead, I have arrived at the
pure datum of intending experience.
In the latter part of Ideasand in several other works, Husserl developed this
method further, showing how to use the newly acquired phenomenological data. For
example, in examining the experience of time, Husserl found that “lived time” is not
the time of clocks and calendars but is always experienced as now. Similarly, in the
experience of “lived space,” one always finds oneself here,and everything else at
different degrees of there.In his article on “Phenomenology” for the Encyclopædia
Brittanica,given here (complete), Husserl explained that it is possible to apply the
phenomenological method not only to the objectsof consciousness but to conscious-
ness itself. When we perform such an <epoche ̄> on consciousness, we discover an
invariant structure: the transcendental ego. “The ‘I’ and the ‘we,’ which we appre-
hend, presuppose the hidden ‘I’ and ‘we’ to whom they are ‘present.’”
Husserl’s thought continues to be influential. Martin Heidegger used the
phenomenological method to develop his ontology, and Jean-Paul Sartre used the
method to develop his own “existential” interpretation of consciousness. Maurice
Merleau-Ponty refined and further applied the phenomenological method.
Husserl has lived on through his followers.
For works on phenomenology in general, see Herbert Speigelberg, The
Phenomenological Movement,two volumes (The Hague, The Netherlands:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1960); Joseph J. Kockelmans, ed.,Phenomenology(Garden City,
NY: Anchor Doubleday, 1967); and Christopher Macann,Four Phenomenological
Philosophers: Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty(London: Routledge,
1993). For a clear and concise comparison of phenomenology and the analytic
tradition, see W.T. Jones,The Twentieth Century to Wittgenstein and Sartre,2nd
edition (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975), Chapters 7 and 8.
Marvin Farber,The Foundations of Phenomenology(Albany, NY: SUNY Press,
1943) provides a standard study of Husserl’s thought, whereas Joseph J. Kockelmans,
A First Introduction to Husserl’s Phenomenology(Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne
University Press, 1967); David Bell,Husserl(New York: Routledge, 1990); Rudolf
Bernet, Iso Kern, and Eduard Marbach, An Introduction to Husserlian
Phenomenology(Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1993); David
Woodruff Smith,Husserl (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2006); and Matheson Russell,
Husserl: A Guide for the Perplexed(London: Continuum, 2006) provide more recent
introductions. Paul Ricoeur,Husserl: An Analysis of His Phenomenology, translated
by Edward G. Ballard and Lester E. Embree (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University
Press, 1967), and Hans-Georg Gadamer,Philosophical Hermeneutics,translated by
David E. Linge (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976) have written studies
of Husserl as well as important works of philosophy themselves. Among the
many studies of particular areas of Husserl’s thought, see David Carr,
Phenomenology and the Problem of History: A Study of Husserl’s Transcendental
Philosophy(Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1974); James M. Edie,
Edmund Husserl’sPhenomenology:A Critical Commentary(Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1987); and Kenneth Liberman,Husserl’s Criticism of Reason: With