282 AUGUSTINE
the past, and likewise a hundred years hence a long time in the future; but we call—
say—ten days ago a short time past, and ten days hence a short time in the future. But
on what grounds can something that does not exist be called long or short? The past no
longer exists and the future does not exist yet. We ought not, therefore, to say, “That is
a long time,” but, when speaking of the past, we should say, “That was long,” and of the
future, “That will be long.”
O my Lord, my light, will your truth not deride us humans for speaking so? This
long time in the past: was it long when it was already past, or earlier than that, when it
was still present? If the latter, yes, then it might have been long, because there was
something to be long; but if it was already past it no longer existed, and therefore could
not have been long, since it was not in existence at all. We ought not, therefore, to say,
“That era in the past was a long one,” for we shall not find anything that was long, for
since that point at which it became past time it has no longer had any being. Rather, we
ought to say, “That era of time was long while present,” because while it was present it
was long. It had not yet passed away and so passed out of existence, and so there was
something there which could be long. But when it passed away it ceased to be long at
that very point when it ceased to be at all.
- Now, human mind, let us consider whether present time can be long, as you
seem to think it can, since you have been granted the power to be aware of duration and
to measure it. Answer my questions, then. Is the present century a long period of time?
Before you say yes, reflect whether a hundred years can be present. If the first of them
is running its course, that year is present, but ninety-nine others are future and therefore
as yet have no being. If the second year is running its course, one year is already past,
another is present, and the remainder are still to come. In the same fashion we may
represent any one of the intervening years of the century as present, and always the
years that preceded it will be past, and those that follow it future. Evidently, then, a
hundred years cannot be present.
Well then, consider whether the one current year at least can be present. If we are
in the first month of it, the other months are in the future; if we are in the second, the
first month is already past and the rest do not yet exist. Even the current year, then, is
not present in its totality, and if it is not present in its totality, the year is not present; for
a year consists of twelve months, and while any one of them is current that one is pre-
sent, but the others are either past or future.
But we must go further, and notice that the current month is not in fact present,
because only one day of it is: if we are on the first day, the rest are future; if on the last,
the others are past; if on any day in the middle, we shall be midway between past and
future days. - Look where this leaves us. We saw earlier that present time was the only one of
the three that might properly be called long, and now this present time has been pared
down to the span of a bare day. But let us take the discussion further, because not even a
single day is present all at once. It is made up of night hours and day hours, twenty-four
in all. From the standpoint of the first hour all the rest are still future; the last hour looks
to all those already past; and any one we pick in between has some before it, others to
follow. Even a single hour runs its course through fleeing minutes: whatever portion of it
has flown is now past, and what remains is future. If we can conceive of a moment in
time which cannot be further divided into even the tiniest of minute particles, that alone
can be rightly termed the present; yet even this flies by from the future into the past with
such haste that it seems to last no time at all. Even if it has some duration, that too is
divisible into past and future; hence the present is reduced to vanishing-point.