Philosophic Classics From Plato to Derrida

(Marvins-Underground-K-12) #1

286 AUGUSTINE



  1. I want to know the essence and nature of time, whereby we measure the
    movement of bodies and say, for instance, that one movement lasts twice as long as
    another. Now I have a question to ask. Taking the word “day” to apply not only to the
    period of sunlight on earth—day as opposed to night, that is—but to the sun’s whole
    course from the east and back to the east again, in the sense that we say, “So many days
    elapsed,” meaning to include the nights, and not reckoning the nights as extra time over
    and above the days; taking it, then, that the movement of the sun in its circular course
    from the east back to the east completes a day, this is my question: is it the movement
    itself that constitutes a day? Or the time it takes? Or both? If the movement constitutes
    a day, then it would still be one day if the sun were to achieve its circuit in an interval of
    time equivalent to a single hour. If it is the time it takes, there would not be a day if the
    space between one sunrise and the next were as short as an hour; the sun would have to
    go round twenty-four times to make up a day. If both were required complete circuit of
    the sun and the customary duration of this—we could not call it a day if the sun traveled
    through its whole circuit in the space of an hour, nor could we if the sun stopped and as
    much time elapsed as it usually takes to run its whole course from morning to morning.
    My question now is not, therefore, what is it that we call a day, but what is time
    itself, the time whereby we would be able to measure the sun’s revolution and say that
    it had been completed in only half the usual time, if the circuit had occupied only
    that space of time represented by twelve hours? We could compare the two periods in
    terms of time and say that one was twice the length of the other, and this would still be
    possible even if the sun sometimes took the single period, and sometimes the double,
    to circle from the east and back to the east again. Let no one tell me, then, that time is
    simply the motion of the heavenly bodies. After all, at the prayer of a certain man the
    sun halted so that he could press home the battle to victory. The sun stood still, but time
    flowed on its way, and that fight had all the time it needed to be carried through to
    the finish.
    I see, therefore, that time is a kind of strain or tension. But do I really see it? Or
    only seem to see? You will show me, O Light, O Truth.
    24, 31. Are you commanding me to agree with someone who says that time is the
    motion of a body? You do not so command me. No corporeal object moves except
    within time: this is what I hear; this is what you tell me. But that a corporeal object’s
    movement is itself time I do not hear; this you do not say. When a body moves, I mea-
    sure in terms of time how long it is in motion, from the moment when it begins until its
    motion ceases. If I did not notice when it began, and it continues to move without my
    seeing when it stops, I cannot measure the time, except perhaps the interval between the
    moment when I began to watch and that when I ceased to observe it. If my observation
    is prolonged, I can only say that the process went on for a long time; I cannot say
    exactly how long, because when we add a definite indication of a length of time we do
    so by reference to some agreed standard. “This is as long as that,” we say; or “This is
    twice as long as that other,” or something similar. If, on the other hand, we have been
    able to note the position of some corporeal object when it moves (or when parts of it
    move, if, for example, it is being turned on a lathe), and we have observed its starting-
    point and its point of arrival, then we are able to state how much time has elapsed while
    the movement of the object was effected from the one place to the other, or how long it
    has taken to revolve on its axis.
    Therefore if the motion of an object is one thing, and the standard by which we
    measure its duration another, is it not obvious which of the two has the stronger claim
    to be called time? Moreover, if the motion is irregular, so that the object is sometimes

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