CITY OFGOD(BOOKXII) 295
We should pay no attention to those who praise fire for its light but condemn its
heat—on the principle that a thing should be judged not by its nature, but by our com-
fort or inconvenience. They like to see it, but hate to be burnt. What they forget is that
the same light which they like is injurious and unsuitable for weak eyes, and that the
heat which they hate is, for some animals, the proper condition for a healthy life.
CHAPTER 5
All natures, then, are good simply because they exist and, therefore, have each its own
measure of being, its own beauty, even, in a way, its own peace. And when each is in the
place assigned by the order of nature, it best preserves the full measure of being that
was given to it. Beings not made for eternal life, changing for better or for worse
according as they promote the good and improvement of things to which, by the law of
the Creator, they serve as means, follow the direction of Divine Providence and tend
toward the particular end which forms a part of the general plan for governing the uni-
verse. This means that the dissolution which brings mutable and mortal things to their
death is not so much a process of annihilation as a progress toward something they were
designed to become.
The conclusion from all this is that God is never to be blamed for any defects that
offend us, but should ever be praised for all the perfection we see in the natures He has
made. For God is Absolute Being and, therefore, all other being that is relative was
made by Him. No being that was made from nothing could be on a par with God, nor
could it even be at all, were it not made by Him.
CHAPTER 6
It follows that the true cause of the good angels’ beatitude lies in their union with
Absolute Being. And if we seek the cause of the bad angels’ misery, we are right in
finding it in this, that they abandoned Him whose Being is absolute and turned to
themselves whose being is relative—a sin that can have no better name than pride.
“For pride is the beginning of all sin” (Eccli. 10:15). They refused to reserve their
strength for Him. They might have had more of being if they had adhered to Him
whose Being is supreme, but, by preferring themselves to Him, they preferred what
was less in the order of being.
Such was the first defect, the first lack, the first perversion of that nature which,
being created, could not be absolute, and yet, being created for beatitude, might have
rejoiced in Him who is Absolute Being; but which, having turned from Him, was
doomed, not to be nothing but to have so much less of being that it was bound to be
wretched.
If one seeks for the efficient cause of their evil will, none is to be found. For, what
can make the will bad when it is the will itself which makes an action bad? Thus, an evil
will is the efficient cause of a bad action, but there is no efficient cause of an evil will. If
there is such a cause, it either has or has not a will. If it has, then that will is either good
or bad. If good, one would have to be foolish enough to conclude that a good will makes
a bad will. In that case, a good will becomes the cause of sin—which is utterly absurd.
On the other hand, if the hypothetical cause of a bad will has itself a bad will, I would
have to ask what made this will bad, and, to put an end to the inquiry: What made the