Philosophic Classics From Plato to Derrida

(Marvins-Underground-K-12) #1

298 AUGUSTINE


The will does not fall “into sin”; it falls “sinfully.” Defects are not mere relations to
natures that are evil; they are evil in themselves because, contrary to the order of
natures, there is a defection from Being that is supreme to some lesser being.
Thus, greed is not a defect in the gold that is desired but in the man who loves it
perversely by falling from justice which he ought to esteem as incomparably superior
to gold; nor is lust a defect in bodies which are beautiful and pleasing: it is a sin in the
soul of the one who loves corporal pleasures perversely, that is, by abandoning that
temperance which joins us in spiritual and unblemishable union with realities far
more beautiful and pleasing; nor is boastfulness a blemish in words of praise: it is a
failing in the soul of one who is so perversely in love with other peoples’ applause
that he despises the voice of his own conscience; nor is pride a vice in the one who
delegates power, still less a flaw in the power itself: it is a passion in the soul of the
one who loves his own power so perversely as to condemn the authority of one who is
still more powerful.
In a word, anyone who loves perversely the good of any nature whatsoever and
even, perhaps, acquires this good makes himself bad by gaining something good and
sad by losing something better.


CHAPTER 9


There is, then, no natural efficient cause of an evil will or, if I may use the word, no
essential cause. The reason for this is that it is the evil will itself that starts that evil in
mutable spirits, which is nothing but a weakening and worsening of the good in their
nature. What “makes” the will evil is, in reality, an “unmaking,” a desertion from God.
The very defection is deficient—in the sense of having no cause. However, in saying
that there is no efficient cause even of a good will, we must beware of believing that the
good will of the good angels was uncreated and co-eternal with God. But, if good
angels were created, how can we say that their good will was not created? The fact is, it
was created; the only question is whether it was created simultaneously with the cre-
ation of the angels or whether they first existed without a good will. If simultaneously,
then, undoubtedly, it was created by Him who created the angels, so that, as soon as
they were created, they adhered to Him who created them by means of that love with
which they were created. Thus, the reason why the bad were separated from the society
of good angels was that the good persevered in the same good will, whereas the others
changed themselves into bad angels by defection from good will. The only thing that
“made” their will bad was that they fell away from a will which was good. Nor would
they have fallen away, had they not chosen to fall away.
In the hypothesis, however, that the good angels, existing at first without a good
will, produced it in themselves without the help of God, they must have made them-
selves better than what they were when God created them. This is nonsense. For, with-
out a good will, what could they be but evil? Or, if we may not say evil, since their will
was not yet evil—for they could hardly fall away from what they had not yet begun to
have—at least, they certainly were not good angels—not as good as they were to
become when they came to possess a good will.
So much for the hypothesis. Since they could not make themselves better than
God made them—for no one can make anything better than God can—then it follows
that, without the co-operation of their Creator, they could never have come into posses-
sion of that good will which made them better.

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