ETHICS(II, P10) 499
Now indeed their ideas also exist not only insofar as they are merely comprehended in the
idea of the circle but also insofar as they involve the existence of those rectangles, with the
result that they are distinguished from the other ideas of the other rectangles.
PROPOSITION 9:The idea of an individual thing existing in actuality has God for its
cause not insofar as he is infinite but insofar as he is considered as affected by another
idea of a thing existing in actuality, of which God is the cause insofar as he is affected
by a third idea, and so ad infinitum.
Proof: The idea of an individual actually existing thing is an individual mode of
thinking distinct from other modes (Cor. and Sch. Pr. 8, II), and so (Pr. 6, II) it has God
as its cause only insofar as he is a thinking thing. But not (Pr. 28, I) insofar as he is a
thinking thing absolutely, but insofar as he is considered as affected by another definite
mode of thinking. And of this latter God is also the cause insofar as he is affected by
another definite mode of thinking, and so ad infinitum. But the order and connection of
ideas is the same as the order and connection of causes (Pr. 7, II). Therefore, an individ-
ual idea is caused by another idea; i.e., God insofar as he is considered as affected by
another idea. And this last idea is caused by God, insofar as he is affected by yet another
idea, and so ad infinitum.
Corollary: Whatsoever happens in the individual object of any idea, knowledge of
it is in God only insofar as he has the idea of that object.
Proof: Whatsoever happens in the object of any idea, the idea of it is in God
(Pr. 3, II) not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he is considered as affected by
another idea of an individual thing (preceding Pr.). But the order and connection of
ideas is the same as the order and connection of things (Pr. 7, II). Therefore, the
knowledge of what happens in an individual object is in God only insofar as he has
the idea of that object.
PROPOSITION 10:The being of substance does not pertain to the essence of man;
i.e., substance does not constitute the form [forma] of man.
Proof: The being of substance involves necessary existence (Pr. 7, I). So if the
being of substance pertained to the essence of man, man would necessarily be granted
together with the granting of substance (Def. 2, II) and consequently man would neces-
sarily exist, which is absurd (Ax. 1, II). Therefore...etc.
Scholium: This Proposition is also proved from Pr. 5, I, which states that there
cannot be two substances of the same nature. Now since many men can exist, that which
constitutes the form of man is not the being of substance. This Proposition is further-
more evident from the other properties of substance—that substance is by its own
nature infinite, immutable, indivisible, etc., as everyone can easily see.
Corollary: Hence it follows that the essence of man is constituted by definite
modifications of the attributes of God.
Proof: For the being of substance does not pertain to the essence of man (preced-
ing Pr.), which must therefore be something that is in God, and which can neither be nor
be conceived without God; i.e., an affection or mode (Cor. Pr. 25, I) which expresses the
nature of God in a definite and determinate way.
Scholium: All must surely admit that nothing can be or be conceived without
God. For all are agreed that God is the sole cause of all things, both of their essence and
of their existence; that is, God is the cause of things not only in respect of their coming
into being [secundum fieri], as they say, but also in respect of their being. But at the