PROPOSITION 36:Inadequate and confused ideas follow by the same necessity as
adequate, or clear and distinct, ideas.
Proof: All ideas are in God (Pr. 15, I), and insofar as they are related to God, they are
true (Pr. 32, II) and adequate (Cor. Pr. 7, II). So there are no inadequate or confused ideas
except insofar as they are related to the particular mind of someone (see Prs. 24 and 28, II).
So all ideas, both adequate and inadequate, follow by the same necessity (Cor. Pr. 6, II).
PROPOSITION 37:That which is common to all things (see Lemma 2 above) and is
equally in the part as in the whole does not constitute the essence of any one particular
thing.
Proof: If this is denied, conceive, if possible, that it does constitute the essence of
one particular thing, B. Therefore, it can neither be nor be conceived without B (Def. 2, II).
But this is contrary to our hypothesis. Therefore, it does not pertain to B’s essence, nor does
it constitute the essence of any other particular thing.
PROPOSITION 38:Those things that are common to all things and are equally in the
part as in the whole can be conceived only adequately.
Proof: Let A be something common to all bodies, and equally in the part of any body
as in the whole. I say that A can be conceived only adequately. For its idea (Cor. Pr. 7, II)
will necessarily be in God both insofar as he has the idea of the human body and insofar as
he has the ideas of affections of the human body, affections which partly involve the natures
of both the human body and external bodies (Prs. 16, 25, and 27, II). That is (Prs. 12 and 13,
II), this idea will necessarily be adequate in God insofar as he constitutes the human
512 BARUCHSPINOZA
Interior of a House,ca. 1660, by
Pieter De Hooch (1629–1684). This
Dutch Baroque painting provides a
visual metaphor for the precise
geometry of Spinoza’s Ethics.
(©Alinari/Art Resource, NY)