596 GOTTFRIEDLEIBNIZ
slipped into the writings of some able mathematicians, but also in metaphysics, in the
better understanding of the principles of things. For motion, if its precise formal content
only—i.e. change of place—is considered, is not a completely real thing, and when sev-
eral bodies mutually exchange their places, it is impossible to determine from these
changes alone which of them ought to have motion or rest attributed to it, as I could
show geometrically if I wanted to dwell on this point now.
But the force or direct cause of these changes is something more real, and there
is some basis for attributing it to one body rather than to another, and it is only
thereby that we can know which one the motion is best attributed to. Now, this force
is something different from size and motion, and it can be concluded from this that
what is conceived in bodies does not consist solely in extension and its modifications,
contrary to the conviction of our moderns. Hence, too, we are obliged to re-establish
some of the beings or forms banished by them. And although all the particular phe-
nomena of corporeal nature can be explained mathematically or mechanically by
those who understand them, it nevertheless appears more and more that the general
principles of corporeal mechanical nature itself are metaphysical rather than geomet-
rical, belonging to forms or indivisible natures functioning as causes of the matter or
extension rather than to corporeal or extended mass—a reflection capable of recon-
ciling the mechanical philosophy of the moderns with the circumspection of some
intelligent well-intentioned people who fear quite reasonably that we are moving too
far from immaterial beings to the disadvantage of piety.
- USEFULNESS OFFINALCAUSES INPHYSICS
As I do not like to judge people’s intentions, or only do so favourably if I can, I am not
accusing our new philosophers of impiety when they claim to banish final causes in
physics. Nevertheless I am obliged to admit that I do not recognise their usual intelli-
gence and prudence therein and that the consequences of this opinion seem dangerous
to me, particularly when it is connected with that refuted by me at the beginning of this
discourse, which seems to lead to their removal altogether, as if God never had any aim,
whether good or active, or as if the good were not the object of His will.... For my
part, I hold on the contrary that it is just there that we have to seek the principle of all
existences and even of the laws of nature, since God always intends what is best and
most perfect.
I am happy to admit that we are liable to error when we want to determine the aims
and counsels of God, but that is only when we try to restrict them to a particular plan, in
the belief that He has only one single thing in view, whereas in fact He considers every-
thing at once. Thus, when we think that God made the world for us alone, we are greatly
mistaken, although it is true that He made it in its totality for us and that there is nothing
in the world that does not affect us and does not also conform to His concerns for us, in
accordance with the above principles. Thus, when we see some good effect or perfection
happening or resulting from the works of God, we can certainly say that God intended it,
for He does nothing by chance and unlike us does not sometimes fail to do well. That is
why, far from being in an error here, akin to that of the overly political who attribute
excessive refinement to the designs of princes, or to that of commentators who search for
too much erudition in their authors, we cannot attribute too many reflections to this infi-
nite Wisdom, and there is no matter in which there is less danger of error as long as we
only affirm and avoid negative propositions here that limit the plans of God.